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The Law of Rescue
Shalini Bhargava Ray*
Diverse areas of law regulate acts ofrescue, often inconsistently.
For example, maritime law mandates rescue, immigrant harboring
law prohibits it, and tort law generallypermits it but does not require
it. Modern legal scholarship has focused principally on mandatory
and permissive forms of rescue. With humanitarian actors facing
prosecution for saving migrants' lives in the Arizona desert and
elsewhere, however, scholarly treatment of the phenomenon of
prohibitedrescue is increasingly urgent.
By analyzing disparate regimes of rescue, and focusing on
migrant rescue specifically, this Article makes three contributions.
First, it argues that the law of rescue generally privileges property
rights and commercialinterests over the ethical dimensions of rescue.
Second, it develops a framework for evaluating rescue, one that
focuses on rescuers'liberty, beneficiaries'dignity,andpotentialthirdparty harm. Third, it identifies and highlights creativeways to achieve
humanitarianends within the law.
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INTRODUCTION

The Pima County Forensic Science Center received the remains of 122
unauthorized migrants during a recent calendar year, over one-third of them from
the hottest part of the Arizona desert. These tragic deaths are common in the
region. They follow from a longstanding border enforcement policy based on
deterrence that obstructs pathways and drives migrants to increasingly hazardous
desert trails. 2 The nongovernmental organization (NGO) No More Deaths

1. MigrantDeaths and the Right to ProvideHumanitarianAid Without Fearof Prosecution,
No MORE DEATHS (Dec. 24, 2018), http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/migrant-deaths-and-the-right-toprovide-humanitarian-aid-without-fear-of-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/C2KK-PCSQ].
2. George Joseph, Why Do Border Deaths Persist When the Number ofBorder Crossings Is
Falling?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-border-deathspersist-when-the-number-of-border-crossings-is-falling [https://perma.cc/2SAA-G85W] (describing
Clinton-era border policy of "Prevention Through Deterrence," which forced "illegal [migrant] traffic"
through "more hostile terrain"); see also ANANDA ROSE, SHOWDOWN IN THE SONORAN DESERT:
RELIGION, LAW, AND THE IMMIGRATION CONTROVERSY 50 (2012) (discussing humanitarian worker's
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(NMD) has been working in the region to stop migrant deaths resulting from this
policy since 2004.3 Its volunteers leave jugs of water on known migrant trails to
4
prevent dehydration and offer shelter and medical care to migrants. A ministry
of the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson, NMD attracts a corps of
volunteers pursuing "civil initiative,"' a term coined by one of the founders of
the American sanctuary movement, Jim Corbett, to refer to a practice of direct
service.6 NMD volunteers contest the militarization of the border and seek to
7
provide humanitarian aid to migrants in need as a matter of faith and decency.
The federal government, however, interprets federal anti-harboring law to
8
prohibit such assistance to unauthorized migrants.
In January of 2018, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) arrested Scott
Daniel Warren, a college geography instructor and longtime NMD volunteer, for
giving food, water, and shelter to two unauthorized migrants at a private
residence known as "the Barn." 9 The U.S. Attorney's Office charged Warren
view that, "[s]ince 1994, migrants have been intentionally pushed into the open desert as a result of
consciously chosen public policy").
3. No MORE DEATHS, supra note 1.
4. Id.
Essay,
5. See Jim Corbett, Sanctuary, Basic Rights, and Humanity'sFault Lines: A Personal
2
2
2
5 WEBER STUD. 7 (1988), https://weberstudies.weber.edu/archive/archive%20A% 0% OVol.% 0110.3/Vol.%205.1/5.lCorbet.htm [https://perma.cc/LQH5-6CZ3] (distinguishing civil initiative from
civil disobedience).
6. See id.; ROSE, supra note 2, at 30 (describing the preference of founders of the sanctuary
movement for civil initiative over civil disobedience); Ming Hsu Chen, Sanctuary Networks and
Integrative Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1361, 1378 (2018) (describing the "soft power" and
creativity of NGOs seeking to "refashion federal immigration policy" through civil initiative).
7. See NO MORE DEATHS, supra note 1; Jacob Gershman, Aidfor Immigrants on Desert Trek
Stirs Religion-Freedom Fight, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aid-forfhttps://perma.cc/EHR7-GT491.
immigrants-on-desert-trek-stirs-religion-freedom-fight- 1544092201
No More Deaths does not describe its work explicitly as "rescue," but it does assert a "humanitarian
presence" and the provision of "emergency first-aid treatment to individuals in distress." Informational
https://nomoredeaths.org/wp2019),
24,
(Dec.
DEATHS
MORE
No
Brochure,
content/uploads/2019/12/NMD-Brochure-2019-ENG-1 .pdf [https://perma.cc/E8AD-GQDE].
8. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that harboring
encompasses "conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's 'remaining in the United States
illegally,"' even if not for the purpose of evading the authorities); Criminal Complaint, United States v.
Warren, No. CR-18-00223-TUC-RCC (DTF) (D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2018) (alleging that defendant provided
food, shelter, and water to unauthorized migrants in violation of the harboring statute). But see United
States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting interpretation of harboring to include
"simple sheltering"); ROSE, supra note 2, at 25-45 (discussing the prosecution of sanctuary workers in
the 1980s for sheltering Central American asylum seekers whose asylum claims the U.S. government
had rejected).
9. See Criminal Complaint, supra note 8 (stating that Border Patrol Agents saw Scott Warren
and two "illegal aliens" exit a Nissan Xterra and enter "the Barn"); Ryan Lucas, Deep in the Desert, a
Case Pits Immigration Crackdown Against Religious Freedom, NPR (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/18/658255488/deep-in-the-desert-a-case-pits-immigration-crackdownagainst-religious-freedom [https://perma.cc/3FHF-R2PM] (describing "the bam"). The government
also alleged that Warren discussed with the migrants various paths to avoid immigration enforcement
checkpoints in the interior. Government's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts
2 and 3, at 2-3, Warren, No. CR-18-00223-TUC-RCC (DTF) (May 2, 2018). In his motion to dismiss
the indictment, however, Warren denied discussing with the migrants tactics for evading the authorities
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with one count of conspiring to transport unauthorized migrants and two counts
of "harboring" them."o Warren argued that his conscience and religious beliefs
compelled him to provide "emergency aid" to the migrants, to quench their thirst,
to feed them, and to give them a place to rest.I' The government contended that
the migrants required no emergency aid. 12 Regardless, the government asserted
that prosecuting Warren was the least restrictive means of pursuing the
"compelling interest" of border security.13 After a hung jury in which eight jurors
voted to acquit and four voted to convict, federal prosecutors decided to retry
Warren on the harboring charge only, dropping charges relating to smuggling
and conspiracy.1 4 On November 20, 2019, a jury acquitted Warren of all felony
charges.' 5 Warren's repeated prosecution illustrates the clash of legal
interpretations between rescuers and the government.16
Areas of law as diverse as tort law, contract law, criminal law, immigration
law, public international law, and maritime law all regulate acts of rescue.
Traditional common law principles of rescue focus on the right, or the absence
of the right, of the person in distress to another person's rescue services.1 7 Some
legal scholars advocate for a legal duty to perform "easy" rescues,'I and others

or providing the migrants with maps, flashlights, or backpacks. See Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts
2 and 3, at 4, Warren, No. CR-18-00223-TUC-RCC (DTF) (Apr. 2, 2018).
10. Indictment at 1, Warren, No. CR 18-223-TUC-RCC (DTF) (Feb. 14, 2018). In addition to
charging Warren, federal prosecutors charged four NMD volunteers who left food and water for
migrants inside the Arizona Wildlife Refuge with criminal misdemeanors for entering a wildlife refuge
without a permit and operating a vehicle inside it. Rafael Carranza, Aid Volunteers Found Guilty of
Dropping Off Water, Foodfor Migrants in ProtectedPart of Arizona Desert, AZCENTRAL (Jan. 18,
2019),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/2019/01/18/no-more-deaths-volunteers-found-guiltydropping-water-food-migrants-cabeza-prieta-refuge-arizona/2617961002/
[https://perma.cc/7YCCPXE9]. After a bench trial, a judge convicted them and concluded that they knowingly committed acts
in violation of the law. See id The volunteers argued that they could not obtain a permit because it would
have required them to vow not to leave food or water in the refuge, their very purpose. See id.
11. See Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, supra note 9, at 5.
12. See Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violations
of International Law, Warren, No. CR-18-00223-TUC-RCC (DTF) (May 2, 2018) (noting that migrants
were in good health upon reaching the Barn).
13. Government's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, supra
note 9, at 12.
14. See Ryan Devereaux, CriminalizingCompassion: The Unravelingof the Conspiracy Case
Against No More Deaths Volunteer Scott Warren, INTERCEPT (Aug.
10, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/08/10/scott-warren-trial/ [https://perma.cc/HN2R-UTSD].
15. Bobby Allyn & Michel Marizco, Jury Acquits Aid Worker Accused of Helping BorderCrossingMigrants in Arizona, NPR (Nov. 21 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/21/781658800/juryacquits-aid-worker-accused-of-helping-border-crossing-migrants-in-arizona
[https://perma.cc/BM77FL57].
16. Cf ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 6 (1975) (describing the complex "field ofaction
and motive" facing judges in a "dynamic model," where the law "is always becoming" and its content
"is frequently unclear").
17. See infra notes 18-20.
18. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structureofthe Law ofAffirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 881 (1986).
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9
defend the absence of such a legal duty.' But this discourse overlooks the
possible right of a rescuer to provide rescue services to a willing recipient, a
critical issue that arises when the law prohibits rescue. Why does the law permit,
or even mandate, some rescues and prohibit others? Modem legal scholarship
has avoided trans-substantive study of legal doctrines relating to rescue, which
20
has prevented this question from being squarely addressed. This Article seeks
not only to fill that gap but also to articulate a theoretical framework for rescue,
and to illustrate its application to rescue of migrants at the border.
Rescue is about having beneficence in the wake of distress, or soothing the
suffering of others, but the law of rescue does not facilitate beneficence. Instead,
as this Article argues, the law of rescue has an economic orientation, manifesting
22
either as economic efficiency 21 or as a heightened concern for property rights.
The law of rescue was not designed to express, promote, or protect the human
24
dignity of beneficiarieS 23 or the liberty of rescuers. Accordingly, the law of
rescue leaves vast areas of important rescue work exposed to prosecution. At the
same time, the law of rescue serves as a site for dissent from official policy,
where rescuers assert against the government a competing vision of who matters,
25
who belongs in a community, and what forms of distress warrant aid.
From the abolitionists prosecuted under the Fugitive Slave Act for rescuing
enslaved persons in the nineteenth century to sanctuary workers charged with
harboring unauthorized migrants more than a century later, the conflict over

19. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-93
(1973) (defending the Good Samaritan rule on the grounds that the would-be rescuer has not caused
harm to the victim).
20. To my knowledge, the only other self-described trans-substantive study of rescue is William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, GoodSamaritans, andOtherRescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (1978). But that study omits any discussion of
prohibited rescue. See id at 85 (limiting study to doctrines in admiralty, restitution, property, and torts).
Other scholars have recognized the value of analyzing disparate rescue regimes together, but they have
not undertaken a comprehensive study ofthe subject. See, e.g., Lawrence Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem
in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779,784 (1954) (comparing admiralty law's duty to rescue property with the
remuneration given to those who captured enslaved people during the colonial era).
21. See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 85.
22. See JEREMY WALDRON, TiE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 39 (1988) (defining an owner
of property as "simply the individual whose determination as to the use of the [property] is taken as final
in a [private property] system").
23. See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 33 (2012) ("[T]he modem notion of
human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every human
being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to
nobility.").
24. Cf ChristopherHeath Wellman,ImmigrationandFreedomofAssociation, 119 ETHICS 109,
109-11 (2008) (justifying the state's power over its borders as an exercise of the state's freedom of
association).
25. See, e.g., MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION
TO MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA 94 (2006) (describing NGOs asserting "a view of the
Central American conflict [producing refugees' flight to the United States] that was quite different from
that promoted by the Reagan and Bush administrations").
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illegal rescue is endemic. 2 6 This Article considers the persistent, recurring clash
of the government's interpretation of prevailing law and rescuers' competing
interpretations, including those premised on a "higher law" 27 such as
international treaties. In doing so, this Article advances an additional claim: that
rescuers and their allies, apart from working for law reform, should leverage
existing protective mechanisms of the law. These protective mechanisms include
statutory interpretation, 28 religious exemptions, 29 bureaucratic discretion, 30 and
administrative preapproval. 3 1 These tools offer an equitable "safety valve" that
guards against punishment for morally-justified conduct. 32 Although these tools
may, to varying degrees, divert energy from truly transformative law reform,
they stand to reorient the law of rescue away from its commercial foundations
and toward more fundamental human values.
This Article trans-substantively explores and illuminates the dominant
theme of the law of rescue, but with an emphasis on the rescue of unauthorized
migrants at the border. This Article focuses on migrant rescue because it captures
the high normative stakes involved when the law prohibits rescue-namely, the
urgent need for rescue and the tremendous desire on the part of volunteers to
provide it. At the same time, the government and many of its supporters
emphasize the third-party costs such rescue produces. These claimed costs

26.
Cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 208-09 (1977) ("Doubtful law is by
no means special or exotic in cases of civil disobedience. On the contrary. In the United States, at least,
almost any law which a significant number of people would be tempted to disobey on moral grounds
would be doubtful - if not clearly invalid - on constitutional grounds as well.").
27. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting O'odham tribe member appealing to
"higher . .. law" to justify leaving jugs of water on reservation land, despite tribe's prohibition on doing
so); Maria Lorena Cook, "HumanitarianAid is Never a Crime": Humanitarianismand Illegality in
MigrantAdvocacy, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 561, 562-63 (2011) ("Humanitarian activists appeal to
higher law, drawing on alternate sources of legitimacy as a way to elude charges . . . .").
28. See, e.g., COVER, supra note 16, at 6-7 (discussing "dynamic interpretation"); Kristina M.
Campbell, HumanitarianAid is Never a Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the
Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 98-100 (2012) (arguing that the harboring statute
should be interpreted not to criminalize the provision of food, water, shelter, and medical care to
undocumented immigrants).
29. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(2018), invalidatedby City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), supersededby statute, Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2018),
as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (continuing to apply RFRA
to the federal government). For a discussion ofhow RFRA might protect sanctuary workers, see Thomas
Scott-Railton, Note, A Legal Sanctuary: How the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Could Protect
Sanctuary Churches, 128 YALE L.J. 408, 433-49 (2018).
30. The term "bureaucratic resistance" appears in PAUL A. LEVINE, FROM INDIFFERENCE TO
ACTIVISM: SWEDISH DIPLoMACY AND THE HOLOCAUST 15 (1996); this concept relies heavily on
bureaucrats' discretion in applying the law.
31. See Italy's Code of Conduct for NGOs Involved in Migrant Rescue, EURONEWS,
https://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrantrescue [https://perma.cc/YV29-9J35].
32. See, e.g., Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1251 (2016) (describing
equitable discretion as a safety valve to introduce a measure ofmercy or leniency "simply out of grace").
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include economic harm 33 and violations of sovereignty, 34 with the view of
migrant rescue as just another "pull-factor." 35 Thus, migrant rescue implicates
rescuer liberty and beneficiary dignity, as well as very serious potential thirdparty costs.
The government has prosecuted migrant rescuers under the federal
harboring statute, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324.36 Under that provision, anyone who

knowingly "conceals, harbors, or shields from detention" any unauthorized
noncitizen commits a crime. 37 Courts have interpreted "harboring" expansively
to cover simple "sheltering," 38 and the statute contains no humanitarian
exception. 39 Using Warren's prosecution as a guiding example of "prohibited
rescue," this Article seeks to illuminate the themes underlying the law of rescue,
develop a theory justifying such rescue under some circumstances, and identify
protective mechanisms in the law to contest the prohibition. Part I analyzes
regimes of discretionary, mandatory, and prohibited rescue, concluding that they
share common themes of economic efficiency and protection of property rights.
Part II rejects the dominance of economic considerations and offers a normative
framework to justify prohibited rescue in moral terms under some circumstances.
Finally, Part IlI highlights tools within the legal system that rescuers may use to
resist criminal punishment for violating prohibitions on morally-justified rescue.
I.
RESCUE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE LAW: THE PRIORITY OF ECONOMIC
INTERESTS

The law alternatingly mandates, permits, or proscribes rescue across
various common law doctrines, statutes, and treaties. Rescue fundamentally
involves aiding others in distress, but the law of rescue has a deeply economic
orientation. The law generally protects a beneficiary's property and commercial
interests more consistently than their life or liberty, and similarly guards third
33. RoSE, supra note 2, at 55 (noting the view of ranchers and members of civilian patrol groups
that "leaving water out in the desert would give undocumented migrants more incentive to try to cross").
34. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attomey General Announces Zero-Tolerance
Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalannounces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/R4HP-UPZP]("[P]romoting
and enforcing the rule of law is vital to protecting a nation, its borders, and its citizens.").
35. Tania Karas, Crimes of Compassion: US Follows Europe'sLead in ProsecutingThose Who
Help Migrants, PUB. RADIO INT'L (June 6, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-06/crimes-

compassion-us-follows-europes-lead-prosecuting-those-who-help-migrants
WYEE] ("NGOs are accused of being a pull factor.").

[https://perma.cc/3U7B-

36. Jasmine Aguilera & Billy Perrigo, They Tried to Save the Lives of Immigrants Fleeing
Danger. Now They're FacingProsecution, TIME (Nov. 11, 2019), https://time.com/5713732/scott-

warren-retrial/ [https://penna.cc/95AX-WP8E] ("[Scott] Warren isn't the first U.S. aid worker to be
prosecuted for helping migrants since Donald Trump was elected on a brash anti-immigrant
platform....").
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1XA)(iii) (2018) (prohibiting harboring).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F. 2d 428,430 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. See Shalini Bhargava Ray, Saving Lives, 58 B.C. L. REv. 1225, 1266 (2017).
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parties from economic harms. This preference for property and commerce, while
not absolute, helps explain disparate regimes of rescue. Commentators have long
argued that rules regulating acts of "disinterested service to others" have sought
to protect economic interests for centuries.4 0 Human life and health gained
relevance with respect to enslaved people or household dependents, whom the
law once treated as economic units of production and cost.4 1 Moreover, Richard
Posner and William Landes argue that economics can "demonstrate the
intellectual unity" of the law of rescue by showcasing the economic efficiency
of rules governing acts of rescue. 4 2
Scholars such as Posner and Landes have previously identified the
economic orientation of the law of rescue, noting its efficient design, 4 3 but have
omitted discussion of prohibited rescue and associated questions. On the one
hand, one could extend the efficiency rationale to prohibited rescueunderstanding prohibitions on rescue as merely correcting for externalities
produced by particular types of rescue-thereby creating a uniform rationale."
But this reasoning masks important normative questions about whose utility
should count and whether the claimed harms justify a prohibition. 45 This Section
will define rescue and analyze discretionary, mandatory, and prohibited rescue
to illuminate the logic underlying the law of rescue.
A.

DefiningRescue

Rescue refers to the act of saving someone or something from harm or
distress. 46 It connotes deliverance from "confinement, danger, or evil," 47 or
40. John P. Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND
THE LAW 63, 64 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1981).
41. See, e.g., Heather L. Ross & Isabel V. Sawhill, The Familyas Economic Unit, 1977 WILSON
Q. 84, 85-86. I do not suggest that economic considerations fully explain various duties arising in family

law.
42. See Landes & Posner, supranote 20, at 85 ("Economics can contribute to the understanding
of rescue law by demonstrating the intellectual unity of the rescue problem, by clarifying legal analysis
of rescue ... and by showing that the major doctrines and case outcomes related to rescue have been
shaped by concern with promoting economic efficiency.").
43. See, e.g., id. at 89.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Efficiency generally does not benefit "elites," but rather represents an optimal outcome
where "everyone" is as well off as possible without anyone being made worse off than their starting
point. However, aside from the question of who is included in the population of persons affected by a
rule or course of conduct, efficiency often has distributional consequences that amplify existing
inequalities. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND

MORAL PHILOSOPHY 127 (1996) (explaining that because property rights are "often taken as starting
points in economic analysis," economists regularly accept the "existing property regime" uncritically).
Efficiency frequently benefits elites in an outsized way. Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 87-88
(discussing Pareto optimality). Protections for owners of ships, boats, and lost property protect interests
of those with the means to own valuable property.
46. Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 83 (defining rescue as "all attempts to save a person or
his property").
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rescue
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
47. Rescue,
[https://perma-cc/5D85-PL7G].
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saving someone or something from a "dangerous, harmful, or difficult
situation." 48 Rescue occurs in response to a crisis or threat of harm. Common
modes of rescue include administering aid to accident victims and pulling
individuals out of fires, gorges, or other dangerous places. 49 Humanitarian aid
administered neutrally and impartially is quintessential rescue. 0 It encompasses
saving lives, "alleviat[ing] suffering," and promoting dignity in response to war,
other human-made crises, or natural disasters." Rescue can also refer simply to
preventing "major loss" to another.5 2 For example, contracts scholars have
argued that rescue encompasses the duty to warn, the duty to disclose, and the
duty to mitigate losses, even when the rescuer did not cause or create the prospect
of loss. 5 3 Thus, rescue refers to the conferral of a significant benefit to another
when that person faces severe distress or potential loss.5 4
Rescuers act to prevent harm, not simply to confer a gratuitous benefit. The
rescuer, often without any expectation of compensation, must have a "reasonable
belief that the [victim] is in danger."55 If a person meets a friend in passing and
gives the friend a bottle of water, the person has conferred a gratuitous benefit
on the friend, but the person has not "rescued" the friend in the ordinary usage
of the word. Even if the friend complains of thirst, the gift of water would not
amount to "rescue" because the gift does not prevent serious harm. Instead, the
level of present or prospective distress must be more than de minimis for a benefit
to rise from merely "produc[ing] . . . [a] favorable effect" to "preventing

48.

Rescue,

CAMBRIDGE

DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/rescue [https://perma.cc/9JNB-UDHW].
49.

§ 32

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

cmt b, illus. 1-3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
50.

See Humanitarian Principles, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES: HANDBOOK FOR

https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44765/humanitarian-principles
EMERGENCIES,
[https://perma.cc/9REL-D3MX] ("The principal motivation of humanitarian action is to save lives and
alleviate suffering in a manner that respects and restores personal dignity.").
DEV.
INITIATIVES,
Assistance,
Humanitarian
Defining
51. See
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defming-humanitarian-aid
[https://perma.cc/2ABF-LM7U].
52. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in ContractLaw, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 647
(2002).
53. Id. at 658 (identifying a duty to mitigate damages under American contract law); id. at 663
(describing the breaching party's duty to wam the non-breaching party of breach if the cost of warning
is "relatively low"); id. at 675 (discussing example pointing to a duty to disclose information). Professor
Eisenberg describes the duty to rescue as "a duty that is imposed by law upon one actor, A, to bestir
himself to take a low-cost, low-risk, and otherwise reasonable action that will forestall a major loss to
another actor, B, although B's peril of prospective loss is not created by A's fault." Id. at 647.
54. Such losses can also be financial. For example, Britain's legislature adopted a "rescue
culture" in corporate insolvency law almost twenty years ago, acknowledging the value of protecting
businesses "as a going concern" whenever possible. Muir Hunter, The Nature and Functionsofa Rescue
Culture, 104 COM. L.J. 426, 435, 441 (1999) (describing British rescue culture's "more benevolent
treatment of insolvent persons ... and at the same time. . . more draconian treatment of true economic
delinquents").
55. Note, The Failureto Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 631,642 (1952).
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harm"-an act of rescue. 56 The distress prompting rescue can be acute, such as
imminent loss, pain, or death;57 or it can be chronic, such as enslavement."
Scholars generally disagree about whether to understand "rescue" as an act
of charity or a moral duty, apart from its treatment in the law. 59 To those who
view rescue as charity, wholly a matter of an individual's grace, such conduct
acquires its quality, vitality, and, perhaps, efficacy from its voluntary character. 60
Some have noted that rescuers engage in acts of rescue to express their
altruism. 61 Others argue that rescue need not be wholly voluntary to qualify as
rescue and that legal compulsion does not diminish the salutary effect of acts of
rescue.62 On this view, we should define rescue by the assistance rendered and
its effect on the recipient, not the goodwill or grace of the rescuer. After all,
professional rescuers compensated for their services are still engaged in rescue.63
B.

DiscretionaryRescue

American common law generally imposes no duty to rescue others," and
good reasons exist to be skeptical of these kinds of affirmative duties. Historical
examples abound of public-spirited affirmative duties fueling nefarious ends. For
example, during the Nazi era, German criminal law required individuals to aid

56.

See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 139 (1984) (defining benefit and harm).

57.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

32 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
58. Even by the lights of individuals who are sympathetic to the plight of migrants and fugitive
slaves, "rescue" is not automatically right or just in all circumstances. For example, statutes that prohibit
the rescue of prisoners could be justified on public safety grounds. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 182501 (West 2006) ("Rescuing prisoners"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 756 (2010) ("Aiding
escape"). On the other hand, mass incarceration for nonviolent offenses and abysmal prison conditions
might give rise to a moral argument in defense of such rescue, even if ultimately such an argument is
rejected.
58. See, e.g., COVER, supranote 16, at 183-85.
59. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community ofAid: A Rejoinder to Opponents ofAffirmative
Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1993) (noting both views regarding the Christian
biblical tradition).
60.

See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 103 (2004) ("By meddling

with issues that are better left to the moral domain, law can only 'reduce the moral worth of human
action,' making altruism increasingly unnecessary, relegating it to 'the dusthin of supererogatory.');
Levmore, supra note 18, at 886 (1986) (discussing Posner's and Landes's argument that a legal
obligation might discourage a rescuer who would have been motivated by altnmism absent a legal
obligation).
61. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 124; Susanne M. Burstein, Note, Saving Steel
Over Souls: The Human Cost of US. SalvageLaw, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 307,330 (2002) (noting argument
against life-salvage awards in maritime law on the theory that they would "'weaken the overwhelming
humanitarian obligation' to [rescue]").
62. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supranote 56, at 130-31.
63. See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 85-86 ("Professional rescue is our term for the sale
(whether voluntarily or through operation of law) of rescue services by profit-maximizing firms to
victims of hazards.").
64. Id at 119 ("The common law has traditionally refused to impose liability for failure to assist
a stranger in distress, no [m]atter how low the costs of assistance would be or how great its benefits.").
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the police.65 Vichy France adopted the same law, imposing on private individuals
66
the obligation to "inform" on their neighbors. A comparative study of duties to
rescue notes that the former Soviet Union imposed a host of duties on its citizens,
including a duty to work for all persons who were capable of working, a duty to
use property "in accordance with its economic end," and a duty to perform "any
'state task."' 67 On the other hand, legal systems that recognize affirmative duties
better protect an individual's right to engage in humanitarian rescue out of
solidarity with those in need.68
For both Kantian and Benthamite reasons, the common law of torts in the
69
United States treats acts of rescue as matters of individual choice. Consider
various scholars' defenses of the no-duty-to-rescue rule on the grounds of
70
individual liberty and freedom of choice. On this view, an individual walking
by a lake should retain the choice to toss or not toss a flotation device to a
drowning person because of the primacy of choice as a moral value and because
71
Commentators have explained the
of an underlying conception of liberty.
common law's failure to recognize a duty to rescue in most circumstances by
noting the difficulty of "enforc[ing] unselfishness" at the expense of "personal
freedom." 72
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance also supports a
rights-based rationale. 73 According to this view, doing a bad act is morally

65. Dawson, supranote 40, at 69.
66. Note, supra note 55, at 639-40.
67. Id at 636-37.
68. Elian Peltier & Richard Pdrez-Pefia, 'Fraternit6'BringsImmunityfor MigrantAdvocate in
France, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.nyimes.comI/2018/07/06/world/europe/francemigrants-farmer-fraternity.html [https://perma.cc/JX8H-87RD].
69. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 129-30 (discussing moral arguments against a duty to
rescue); see also Amelia J. Uelmen, Where Morality and the Law Coincide:How Legal Obligations of
Bystanders May Be Informed by the Social Teachings of Pope Francis,40 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1359,
1395-97 (2017) (describing Kantian arguments against a duty to rescue in tort law); Eugene Volokh,
Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects ofLaw, 88 GEO. L.J. 105, 106-07 n.6 (1999) (noting
"moral debates about whether a duty to rescue or report would impose an impermissible burden on
individual liberty" and collecting scholarship).
70. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 19, at 190-91 (defending the absence of a duty to rescue
another on the grounds that a defendant who declines to rescue a plaintiff in need does not cause the
plaintiff's harm); id at 195 (arguing that "the common law has never found a home for" obligations to
confer gratuitous benefits on others).
71. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 130-31 (discussing Jeffrie G. Murphy's defense of the
choice not to save the drowning child on the ground that a person declining to save the child has not
violated the child's rights, and further characterizing this view as one that regards "our moral claim
against others [as one that] is only to be let alone, that is, not harmed").
Allen M. Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans,34 MODERN L. REV. 241, 242 (1971).
72.
73. See Epstein, supranote 19; Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the ImportanceofRemoteness to the
Duty to Rescue, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 319-20 (1997); Emest J. Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 250 (1980) (describing Epstein's view). Scholars have critiqued this
distinction as a "chimera" and have emphasized that the canonical cases for the no-duty-to-rescue rule
often make no reference to it. Lake, supra,at 360. Thus, the distinction may lack the importance typically
assumed.
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distinct from failing to do a good act. One does not violate another individual's
rights simply by declining to aid them. 74 Where an individual creates or
contributes to harm, that individual has some obligation to cure that harm;
otherwise, the individual has no obligation.75 Thus, the law should not punish the
mere failure to act, even if such a rule seems heartless or immoral.
Others have argued from a consequentialist standpoint that mandating
rescue harms society overall. On this view, imposing a duty to rescue will likely
backfire and reduce the total incidence of rescue, as "reluctant rescuers"7 6 Will
eschew risky activities in order to avoid potential liability. 77 The quality of rescue
acts could also plummet if individuals are forced to rescue others.7 1 A greater
risk of harm to rescuers themselves arises when they undertake rescue without
confidence in their own ability to rescue or in the likelihood of success.79
Discretionary rescue has deep roots in U.S. common law, but critics have
assailed the absence of a duty to rescue by appealing both to rights and
consequences. 80 Professor Joel Feinberg has argued that a person's failure to
perform a low-risk rescue plays a morally relevant causal role in harming the
victim, thus infringing on the victim's rights.8 1 An adult walking by a lake in
which a child is drowning has an obligation to toss a readily available flotation
ring to the child. Under such circumstances, the adult who fails to toss the ring
does not merely refrain from conferring a benefit on the child; the adult harms
the child.82 Feinberg distinguishes assistance to another that improves that
person's status beyond their baseline from assistance that restores another
person's pre-crisis status.83 No one has an obligation to confer on another person
74. Epstein, supranote 19, at 190-91.
75. Id.
76. Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in
American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1469-80 (2008) (discussing the costs of a rule mandating
rescue).
77. Landes & Posner, supranote 20, at 120 (analogizing liability to a "tax" on risky activities,
leading to substitution away from such activities).
78. Scordato, supranote 76, at 1472 (arguing that the "reluctant rescuer" will "engage in a lower
quality of rescue effort").
79. Scordato, supranote 76, at 1476-78 (2008) (discussing risk of harm to less capable rescuers
forced to act when the law requires rescue); see also Levmore, supranote 18, at 884 (describing Posner's
and Landes's argument against a duty to rescue).
80. See, e.g., Lake, supranote 73; Levmore, supra note 18; Linden, supranote 72; Note, supra
note 55; John T. Pardun, Comment, GoodSamaritanLaws: A Global Perspective, 20 LOy. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 591 (1998); Weinrib, supra note 73; Yeager, supranote 59.
81. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 136-39. But see Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and
Liberty: The Case ofRequiredRescue, 89 GEo. L.J. 605,627-28 (2001) (critiquing Feinberg's causation
analysis as excessive, for under it, "just about any setback to a person's interest can count as a violation
of a right").
82. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 136-39; cf Patricia Smith, The Duty to Rescue and the
Slippery Slope Problem, 16 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 19, 24 (1990) (arguing that the "lack of causation
seems to fade into irrelevance in clear cases" because the failure to act constitutes "willful and reckless
disregard for human life").
83.

See FEINBERG, supranote 56, at 136-39; PATRICIA SMiTH, LIBERALIsM AND AFFIRMATIVE

OBLIGATION 40 (1998) (supporting Feinberg's analysis).
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a gratuitous benefit or "windfall," but they do have an obligation to prevent loss
to a victim when they can do so without risk of undue harm or expense to
themselves.84

Professor Steven J. Heyman similarly argues for a duty to rescue based on
rights associated with shared citizenship rather than on the individual rights and
duties of private persons.85 Heyman regards the criminal assault, rooted in
wrongful human conduct, rather than the accidental drowning of a stranger, as
the "paradigm case of a duty to rescue."86 Once the law recognizes a duty to
prevent criminal harm to others, premised on shared citizenship, it need expand
87
only modestly to impose a duty to prevent noncriminalharms to others. On this
view, for example, allowing an individual to elect not to save a drowning child,
when such rescue would be relatively easy for the rescuer, would violate a moral
88
obligation and should also violate the law.
Others have argued for a duty to rescue on efficiency grounds rather than
89
on rights grounds, contra earlier economic analysis of such a duty. Professor
Richard L. Hasen has argued that Posner and Landes's conclusion that a duty to
rescue could be inefficient depends greatly on the assumption that the population
of potential rescuers is completely distinct from the population of potential
victims.9 Hasen argues for a "more realistic behavioral assumption that
individuals assess the probability of being a victim or potential rescuer if
91
involved in a rescue situation as about equal." On that assumption, individuals
would not avoid hazardous areas because they would see themselves as equally
92
likely to be a rescuer or a victim needing rescue if an accident were to occur.
Accordingly, the substitution effect Posner and Landes posited would not occur,
93
and a rule requiring rescue would be optimal.
The surface libertarianism of discretionary rescue, however, masks other
values embedded in the law of rescue; namely, the social utility of rescue, or the
good bestowed upon the beneficiary. The law actively promotes rescue where it
does not require it through so-called "Good Samaritan" laws that protect

84. See SMrrH, supranote 83, at 40 (describing Feinberg's view but noting that Feinberg does
not explain why individuals have a duty to prevent losses to others).
85. Steven J. Heyman, Foundationsof the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 680 (1994).
86. Id. at 679.
87. Id
88. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 130-31 (critiquing Jeffrie G. Murphy's defense of the
choice not to save the child).
89. See, e.g., Eric H. Grush, Comment, The Inefficiency of the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule and a
Proposed "SimilarRisk" Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 881 (1998); Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient
Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1995).
90. Hasen, supra note 89, at 142 (noting that none of the critiques of Landes's and Posner's
analysis "has challenged the analysis's underlying behavioral assumption that the world is divided into
two classes: potential rescuers and victims").
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Id
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rescuers.94 These laws typically insulate rescuers from liability stemming from
failed, botched, or otherwise loss-producing rescues." Such protection
encourages rescue by reducing potential rescuers' costs. 9 6 Without protection for
acts of rescue that might fail or go astray, rescuers will fear potential liability for
their well-intentioned deeds and will be less likely to help. 97
Similarly, the law sometimes provides compensation to rescuers for injuries
a rescuer incurs through an act of rescue, even if the rescuer contributed to the
harm they suffered.98 Pursuant to the "rescue doctrine," courts consider whether
the individual or company who caused the original danger could foresee the
rescuer's harms. 99 Even if a rescuer bears some responsibility for the harm they
suffer, the original defendant might be liable if such harm to a potential rescuer
was reasonably foreseeable.100
Finally, aside from damages at common law, equity offers remedies for
rescuers. If a rescuer seeks recovery from the rescued person rather than from
the original defendant or tortfeasor, perhaps because no tortfeasor exists, the
claim arises from the equitable doctrine of restitution.' 0 1 The common law of
restitution generally recognizes recovery where the rescue succeeded and could
be understood as premised upon a hypothetical contract.1 02 But courts decline to
award Good Samaritans compensation on a theory of restitution for labor
expended in rescuing a person because they deem the rescuer's service

94. See Eric A. Brandt, Good SamaritanLaws - the Legal Placebo: A CurrentAnalysis, 17
AKRON L. REv. 303, 304 (1983) (describing Good Samaritan statutes as shielding "altruistic rescuers
from possible liability for any negligent acts or omissions arising out of their rescue attempts" and
contrasting those statutes with the common law that did not recognize such immunity for negligent
rescues); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, ConstructionandApplicationof "Good Samaritan-Statutes,
68 A.L.R 4th 294 (2020).
95. See Brandt, supranote 94, at 303-04,310-18 tbl.I (noting variation among Good Samaritan
statutes, with some providing no additional protection to rescuers than the common law did).
96. See Veilleux, supranote 94.
97. See id.; McDaniel v. Keck, 53 A.D.3d 869, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). Under the traditional
common law doctrine, altruistic but negligent rescues could lead to liability. See, e.g., Mueller v.
McMillian Warner Ins. Co., 714 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. 2006). On this rule, a person who chooses to
undertake rescue must use reasonable care in executing the rescue. See Linden, supra note 72, at 251.
98.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABLITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 32 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010); e.g., Hutton v. Logan, 566 S.E.2d 782, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(describing rescue doctrine's effect in preventing a tortfeasor from resisting a claim for damages from
an injured rescuer based on the rescuer's contributory negligence).
99.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 32 cmt. b; e.g., McCoy v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 961 P.2d 952, 956 (Wash. 1998) (describing the
rescue doctrine).
100.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§32 cmts. b, d.
101. Noncontractual rescue can be regarded as the conferral of a benefit on a party that obligates
that party to compensate the person conferring the benefit, or unjust enrichment See Ross A. Albert,
Comment, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 85, 109-10 (1986);
Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principleof Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 2083, 2084 (2001).
102. See DAGAN, supra note 60, at 94,96. But see Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442,447-48 (Or. 1887).
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gratuitous. 103 However, commentators have encouraged courts to reverse this
presumption and to consider awarding compensation for expenditures and
costs. 104

In a variety of ways, the common law encourages rescue without requiring
it, preserving the liberty of the rescuer and recognizing the benefit to the victim
rescued.
C.

MandatoryRescue

Although the common law does not impose a general duty to rescue, it does
require rescue under some circumstances. In the realm of statutory or treaty law,
the law often requires rescue. Analyzing examples in torts and maritime law, this
Section argues that mandatory rescue regimes reveal a preoccupation with
protecting property rights and the commercial interests of those with relative
economic advantage (i.e., those possessing the resources to acquire property or
commercial interests in the first place). When rescue augments property rights,
the law tends to require rescue.
1.

Common Law Duties to Rescue Between PartiesHaving a "Special
Relationship"

Discretionary rescue in the common law becomes mandatory when the
0
person in distress and the would-be rescuer have a "special relationship."" s
106
Specifically,
These so-called "special" relationships are largely commercial.
the Restatement of Torts specifies that the following "special relationships" give
"rise to the [mandatory] duty to rescue":
1)

a common carrier with its passengers,
2) an innkeeper with its guests,
3) a business or other possessor of land that holds its premises
open to the public with those who are lawfully on the premises,
4) an employer with its employees, [under limited circumstances],
5)
6)
7)

a school with its students,
a landlord with its tenants,
a custodian with those
circumstances] .107

in its custody,

[under limited

103. See Albert, supranote 101, at 90 (discussing "common law barriersto restitution" to include
that the notion that an unsolicited benefit is a gift).
104. See, e.g., id. at 86-87.
105.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 40

(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
106. See Yeager, supra note 59, at 10 ("Service, employment, or economically-oriented
relationships are 'special,' while 'one's nephew, one's neighbor (and the neighbor's baby) are
"strangers."').
107.

§ 40(b).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
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Commentators note that courts' policy judgments often inform which
relationships are identified as "special." 108 Moreover, this default regime of
duties promotes efficiency by eliminating the transaction costs of countless
bargains between producers and consumers.1 09 Thus, while common carriers,
innkeepers, businesses, employers, and landlords are all obligated to aid those
who pay them for a consumer good or service, or who provide labor in exchange
for payments, they also benefit from the duty. Not all special relationships relate
to commerce, however, and scholars have argued that the label "special
relationship" communicates the conclusion that a court has recognized a duty
rather than the rationalefor imposing one.I1 0 In most of the settings listed in the
Restatement, mandatory rescue efficiently designates an on-site rescuer, as a
Good Samaritan is unlikely to come upon the scene and assist." The designated
rescuers are "the cheapest cost avoiders," and in this sense, the duty promotes
efficiency."i 2
Just as these special relationships in tort law trigger the duty to rescue, so
does the relationship between contracting parties under some circumstances. 1 13
Contract law entitles the party in breach to the non-breaching party's assistance
in the form of mitigation; in other settings, the law also imposes a duty to warn
on the breaching party.11 4 Professor Melvin Eisenberg argues that this regime
treats contracting parties as having a "special relationship," thus harmonizing the
doctrine with tort law's exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule."'s In these
ways, both sets of common law duties to rescue-those arising out of tort as well
as contract-facilitate commercial relations and are often justified as efficient.
2.

Maritime Salvage Law andthe Duty to Rescue at Sea

Although the duty to rescue any person in distress at sea is often considered
one of the noblest duties under international law and many domestic statutes,
many scholars have observed that this duty evolved from law defining duties to

108.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40
cmts. b, h.
109. See Eisenberg,supra note 52, at 647.
110. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There's No Such Thing as Affirmative
Duty, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1649,1666 (2019).
111. Parental duties to rescue in tort law are uncertain. See Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G.
Hargrove, The Tort Duty ofParents to ProtectMinor Children, 51 VILL. L. REv. 311, 311-13 (2006).
Some scholars have noted the ancient pedigree of"[t]he notion of the child as property." Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierceand the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 995, 1043 (1992). Professor Woodhouse further argues that, although the law today does not
regard children as property, "our culture makes assumptions about children deeply analogous to those it
adopts in thinking about property." Id at 1042.
112. Catherine M. Sharkey, In Search of the Cheapest Cost Avoider: Another View of the
Economic Loss Rule, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1039 (2018).
113. See Eisenberg,supranote 52, at 647.
114. See id. at 660, 663.
115. Seeid.at691.
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rescue ships and cargo.116 International and domestic law have developed
significantly over the past century to produce a mix of discretionary and
mandatory rescue laws, including laws that recognize the right of migrants and
people "engaged in unlawful activity" to be rescued. While this appears to reflect
a prioritization of life, states struggle to enforce the obligation to rescue people,
compensation is uncertain, and the applicable duties stop short of requiring
countries to allow migrants rescued at sea to disembark from the rescue vessel
and enter into the haven state to apply for humanitarian protection.
Maritime salvage law began as a civil law framework for compensating
rescuers saving ships and cargo.117 An act of maritime salvage is "the [voluntary]
rescue of a ship or its cargo on navigable waters from a peril that, except for the
11
rescuer's assistance, would have led to the loss or destruction of the property.""
Within this context, every successful maritime salvage creates a right to
compensation for salvors and an incentive for them "to save valuable property
from marine perils." 1 9 To be eligible for such an award, the salvor must prove
that the subject of salvage was maritime property 20 in peril not created by the
salvors, that the salvors voluntarily rendered aid in the absence of any legal
obligation, and that the results were successful or contributed to ultimate
success. 121 Even if rescue efforts are unsuccessful, salvors may nonetheless be
entitled to compensation for the amount deserved based on their labor under a
quantum meruit theory of recovery. 122
A detailed scheme for compensation promotes the rescue of vessels and
cargo. The requirement that the salvors be volunteers follows from the notion
that one should not be compensated for fulfilling one's existing obligations to
rescue.1 23 If a salvor is required by, say, an insurance policy to rescue a ship, the
salvor cannot turn to salvage law for an award. 124 The principal exception is

116.

See, e.g., G. H. Robinson, The Admiralty Law ofSalvage, 23 CoRNELL L. REV. 229 (1938).

117.

See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 771 (6th ed. 2019).

https://www.britannica.com/topic/salvage
BRITANNICA,
118. Salvage, ENCYCLOPEDIA
[https://perma.cc/BK9X-ZNMY].
119. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 117, at 772.
120. Definition
of
Maritime
Property,
LAW
INSIDER,
[https://perma.cc/JQ84-EZ9F] (defining
https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/maritime-property
maritime property as "vessels and their engines, tackle, gear, equipment, appurtenances, furnishings,
cargoes, stores, personal property then on board belonging to the vessels' occupants, and such other
similar property as is consistent with the general maritime law of the United States").
121. See Robinson, supranote 116, at 231, 236, 242 ("It is sufficient ifhe endeavor to do so and
his efforts have a causal relation to the eventual preservation of it.").
1910),
ed.
(2d
DICTIONARY
LAW
BLACK'S
Quantum Meruit,
122. See
https://thelawdictionary.org/quantum-meruit [https://perma.cc/P2RU-KRR6]; Robinson, supra note
116, at 244. Salvors may be liable for "faults in beneficence" if the rescue attempt goes astray and
induces further damage to the distressed ship and its cargo. Id at 247.
123. See id. at 239.
124. See id. at 237.
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"contract salvage," wherein the salvor contracts with the distressed vessel's
captain to perform the salvage operation prior to commencing salvage. 125
Salvage awards have traditionally depended on several factors, including:
1)

the labor expended by the salvors in rendering
the salvage service;
2) the promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the
service and saving the property;
3) the value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering
the service and the degree of danger to which such property was
exposed;
4) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from
the impending peril;
5) the value of the saved property; and
6) the degree of danger from which the property was rescued. 126
The value of the cargo on board and any possible reduction in its value also affect
salvage awards.

127

All of this underscores maritime salvage law's purpose of promoting
economic efficiency. 128 It establishes incentives for those best situated at sea to
save valuable property and thus promote "the best use of productive
resources." 29 Commentators note the lesser need for such a doctrine with respect
to endangered property on land.1 30 Maritime rescuers, as professionals, operate
in a distinct economic environment from laypeople on land-their work more
specialized, their rescues costlier.131 Accordingly, maritime salvage law reflects
the unique challenges of rescue at sea.1 32
Maritime salvage law financially rewards the rescue of ships and cargo, but
those who save "mere life," known as "pure life salvors," were for many years
compensated only with the moral satisfaction of doing a good deed. 133 Rescuers
who saved lives incident to saving property fared better.1 34 Some have attributed
this seemingly inequitable result to the in rem nature of a salvage action, which
places compensation for life salvage outside the scope of a typical maritime
125.

(2004).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See ROBERT FORCE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 157, 160

Id at 168.
See Robinson, supranote 116, at 257-58.
See SCHOENBAUM, supranote 117, at 772.
Id
See, e.g., id.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 118.
See id

133. Jason Parent, Comment, No Duty to Save Lives; No Rewardfor Rescue: Is That Truly the
State ofInternationalSalvageLaw?, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 87, 109 (2006); see also Steven
F. Friedell, Compensation andRewardfor Saving Life at Sea, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1218, 1223-24 (1979)
("[C]ourts and writers have tended to agree that the general maritime law gives no reward for saving life
when no property is saved.").
134. See Friedell,supra note 133, at 1223-24.
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proceeding.13 5 As the court's jurisdiction is based on the property rather than its
owner, any recovery takes the form of a lien, which cannot apply to a rescued
person.' 36

Commentators decried the law's preference for property in this setting, and
international and domestic law responded by explicitly providing for life salvage
awards, as well as by imposing duties to rescue both persons and vessels in
distress at sea.' 37 In 1910, at the international level, various countries adopted
the Brussels Convention on Assistance and Salvage at Sea (Brussels
Convention). 3 8 The Brussels Convention established a master's duty to rescue
"everybody, even ... an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost," provided
the master "can do so without serious danger to his vessel, her crew and
passengers."' 9 The treaty, however, left the determination of life salvor
40
remuneration to treaty signatories.1
Congress implemented this treaty through the Salvage Act of 1912, thus
creating the first federal duty to rescue at sea.141 Like the Brussels Convention,
the Salvage Act requires rescue of "every person who is found at sea in danger
of being lost," so long as the salvors can effectuate rescue "without serious
danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers." 42 This federal duty to rescue
distressed vessels and persons, on pain of a $1,000 penalty, meant that two sets
of domestic laws regulated rescue at sea: maritime salvage law, which awarded
43
discretionary rescue, and federal maritime statutes, which mandated rescue.1
Scholars have suggested that courts interpreted the Brussels Convention and
Salvage Act provisions on life salvage awards too narrowly, with the result that
the new regime provided less generous awards than what the former maritime
law had provided.'" In contrast to the clarity with which the law addresses
compensation for salvage of maritime property, these developments show the
legal system grappling with various sources of complexity relating to rescue,
namely, whether to create a legally enforceable duty, whether to extend such a
duty from vessels to people, and how to reward successful efforts relating to
both. State creation of a duty to rescue did not resolve questions of incentives

135. See Albert, supra note 101, at 113 ("The rationale for the rule denying an award for life
salvage has to do with the nature of a salvage proceeding. The action brought by a salvor is in rem
against the ship or any other property rescued.").
136. Id
137. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage
at Sea art. 11, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Friedell, supra note 133, at 1245.
141. See 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (2018); Patrick J. Long, Note, The Good SamaritanandAdmiralty:
A Parableofa Statute Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 595-96 (2000).
142. Robinson, supranote 116, at 239.
143. See id
144. See, e.g., id
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and compensation, and courts generally remained reluctant to award
compensation for pure life salvage. 145
Congress subsequently enhanced the incentives for rescue through the
Standby Act in 1983.146 This statute obligates masters of vessels involved in a
collision to "stand by" the other vessel "until [they have] ascertained that she has
no need of further assistance."1 4 7 It further clarifies that rescuers are "entitled to
protection from liability" for acting in an "ordinary, reasonable, and prudent
manner." 148 Adding this "Good Samaritan" protection for maritime rescuers
brought maritime law into alignment with the approach used in tort law. 149
Other treaties establish a duty to rescue persons in distress at sea,'s0 but
enforcement of the duty remains a challenge."' Despite the many international
treaties on the topic, it would be a mistake to read these provisions as prioritizing
life. Instead, states' consent to these obligations rests on respect for states'
sovereignty above all else. None of these treaties create a right of entry for
migrants or a duty on states to accept migrants into their territories, or even at
their ports.1 52 In fact, maritime law allows haven states to close their ports to
rescued migrants.' 53 These treaties also may complicate rescue efforts at sea. For
example, once rescuers prevent migrants from drowning and bring them onto
boats where they can drink water, receive medical care, and warm themselves,
rescuers face a host of ambiguities.' 5 4 Do the rescuers have a right to disembark
the migrant passengers? Where, and on what terms? 5 5 Must they turn back? Will
rescuers entering a state's territorial waters with a boat of unauthorized migrants
be prosecuted for smuggling? Commentators note that neither maritime law nor

145. See Burstein, supranote 61, at 330 ("[T]he United States persisted in its narrow reading of
the statute and continues to uphold the law denying rewards to pure life salvors.").
146. 46 U.S.C. § 2303 (2018). See also Marilyn Raia, Rescue at Sea, PAC. MAR. MAG. (July 1,
2015),
https://www.pacmar.com/story/2015/07/01/maritime-law/rescue-at-sea/357.html
[https://permacc/NF94-ZY23] (discussing the Standby Act).
147. SCHOENBAUM, supranote 117, at 813.
148. 70 AM. JUR. 2D Shipping § 484 (2019).
149. The international community further updated the international salvage regime in 1989 with
ratification of the International Convention on Salvage, replacing the Brussels Convention. International
Convention on Salvage, adoptedApr. 28, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 12, 1953 U.N.T.S. 165.
150.

See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

283-84 (3rd ed. 2007).
151. See Irini Papanicolopulu, The Duty to Rescue at Sea, in Peacetime and in War: A General
Overview, 98 INT'L REv. OF THE RED CROSS 491, 492 (2016) (claiming that "the duty to rescue is one
of the best-established principles of the international law of the sea, maritime law and international
humanitarian law (IHL)" but acknowledging many unresolved issues).
152. See GOODWIN-GLL & McADAM, supranote 150, at 279.
153. See Eugenio Cusumano & Kristof Gombeer, In Deep Waters: The Legal, Humanitarianand
PoliticalImplications of Closing Italian Ports to Migrant Rescuers, 25 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 245,
247-49 (2020).
154.

See ANNE T. GALLAGHER & FIONA DAvID, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MIGRANT

SMUGGLING 444-45 (2014).
155. See id.

2020]

THE LAW OF RESCUE

639

refugee law solves the dilemma facing rescuers bringing migrants to the port of
a potential haven state. 15 6
Moreover, as scholars have noted, states rarely enforce the duty to rescue
at sea.157 The difficulty of enforcement lies in the remote relationship of the
vessel's crew to the state with which they have registered the vessel.' 5 8 All ships
must fly under a state flag, and public international law imposes rescue
obligations on such flag states. 15 9 Often, however, flag states lack a meaningful
relationship to the master or crew of the vessel; the flag state is simply where the
ship is registered.1 60 In such a situation, the flag state functionally exercises no
control over the ship.161 Yet rescuers are often required to communicate with
distant and disinterested flag states about the state of rescue operations in order
to proceed.1 62 Moreover, flag states seldom prosecute masters of vessels flying
under their flag who renege on their rescue obligations. 163 Scholars have
suggested that port states, or "the states at whose ports these vessels call," 1 6
might enforce these obligations more effectively, but until then, life salvage
65
appears to be a manifestation of a grudging accommodation.1 Thus, a state's
right to exclude-an exercise of sovereignty and dominion over its propertyconstrains the humanitarian potential of the duty to rescue at sea.' 66 Ultimately,
the laws governing the rescue of vessels and people at sea privilege maritime
property and the protection of national territory from migrants, reinforcing elite
interests.

156. See, e.g., Ray, supranote 39, at 1243-44 (noting this dilemma).
157. See, e.g., Martin Davies, Obligations and Implicationsfor Ships EncounteringPersons in
NeedofAssistance at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 109, 140 (2003) (discussing how the duty to rescue
at sea is ineffectively enforced through civil law).
158. See id. at 125 (discussing the phenomenon of "[f]lag-of-convenience" states and their
disinclination to enforce legal duties at sea); Flag of Convenience, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
[https://perma.cc/FVN5https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/flag-of-convenience
89RG] (defining "flag of convenience" as an arrangement by which a ship operates and is taxed "under
the laws of a country different from its home country in order to save money").
159. See Davies, supra note 157, at 110; see also RICHARD COLES & EDWARD WATT, SHIP
REGISTRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2009) (describing public international law's requirement
that every vessel on the high seas have a nationality, and noting that "[n]ationality is attributed to vessels
flying the flag of a State in which the vessel is publicly registered"). Thus, a vessel's "flag state" is the
State in which the vessel is publicly registered.
160. See Davies, supra note 157, at 110.
161. See id
162. See Eugenio Cusumano, StraightjacketingMigrant Rescuers? The Code of Conduct on
Maritime NGOs, 24 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 106, 109-10 (2019).
163. See Davies, supranote 157, at 125.
164. Cedric Ryngaert & Henrik Ringbom, Introduction:Port StateJurisdiction:Challenges and
Potential, 31 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 379, 380; see also Daniel Bodansky, Protecting the
MarineEnvironmentfrom Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III andBeyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719,
739 (discussing port state jurisdiction as jurisdiction based on the presence of a vessel at a state's port).
165. See Ryngaert & Ringbom, supra note 164, at 392.
166. Cf U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), pmbl., openedfor signatureDec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (recognizing "due regard for the sovereignty of all States"). The United
States is not a party to UNCLOS.
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MiscellaneousAffirmative Duties to Rescue

Some jurisdictions apply affirmative duties to rescue on land, generally for
the sake of efficiency. Civil law countries such as France and Germany impose
duties to rescue, and scholars have argued that these legal regimes, in their
design, could be economically efficient. 167 In the former Soviet Union, such a
duty existed for openly economic purposes, including "the safeguarding of
public property." 16 8 Apart from promoting efficiency, these laws may also reflect
the legacy of authoritarianism. 1 69 For example, no duty to rescue existed in
France until World War II; however, based on the Vichy government's law that
required people to "aid" each other and inform on each other, France
subsequently adopted a general duty to assist others in peril.1 70
Affirmative duties to rescue are thought to be rare outside of public
international law and European civil law jurisdictions.17 1 Yet, in the 1970s, a few
states in the United States adopted statutes that criminalized the failure to rescue
others when such rescue could be accomplished without "danger or peril" to the
rescuer. Vermont was the first. 172 Its Duty to Aid the Endangered Act established
that:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
himself or without interference with important duties owed to others,
give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance
or care is being provided by others.1 7 3
Section (c) of the statute further establishes that persons who willfully violate
subsection (a) "shall be fined not more than $100.00." Notably, the statute did
not limit the imposition of this duty to persons with "special skills or
relationships," 74 thus establishing a much broader scope than the exceptions
17
under tort law. Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin adopted similar laws.s
These duties typically only apply when rescue can be accomplished cheaply, thus
explicitly reflecting a concern for efficiency. 176

167. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 125-26.
168. Note, supranote 55, at 635.
169. See id. at 639-40.
170. Id.
171. However, one scholar has recently documented that statutes imposing a duty to aidthrough rescue or report-are much more common than other scholars had previously claimed. See
Zachary D. Kaufman, ProtectorsofPredatorsor Prey: Bystandersand UpstandersamidSexual Crimes,
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1345-46 (2019).
172. Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 51, 54-55
(1972).
173. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2020); see also Franklin, supranote 172, at 54 (quoting
same).
174. Franklin, supra note 172, at 60.
175. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2018 & Supp. 2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-56-1 (West
2020); WIS. STAT. § 940.34 (2020).
176. Landes & Posner, supranote 20, at 126.
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D. ProhibitedRescue
Prohibitions on rescue typically promote the interests of a society's
insiders, or those with relative economic advantage. They undermine the
interests of outsiders, or those deemed "other." Thus, the law might operate to
maximize utility, but often on a restricted view of whose utility counts. From the
prosecution of rescuers under the Fugitive Slave Act in the nineteenth century to
the contemporary prosecution of humanitarians providing aid to unauthorized
migrants in the Arizona desert, these legal regimes evidence an elite skew. The
Fugitive Slave Act's prohibition on rescue and imposition of a duty to capture
humans regarded as another's property provides a stark illustration.
The Fugitive Slave Act's Prohibitionon the Rescue ofEnslaved
Persons
Mandatory rescue reveals the law of rescue's implicit priorities; prohibited
rescue underscores them. American legal history offers an illustrative example
of prohibited rescue; namely, the nineteenth century prohibition on assisting in
the escape of enslaved persons. The legal framework prohibiting rescue of others
quite explicitly protected property owners' interests to the detriment of enslaved
77
persons. It also served as a site for dissent and competing policy visions.1
Scholars and jurists have expounded on the brutality of the slave system,
some observing that the underlying legal theory was not simply the legal fiction
that people were property. 178 Rather, some slavery apologists regarded the
slave's labor as the slave owner's property and some regarded the slave's body
itself as such. 179 Both conceptions violated the Lockean concept that every
8
person owns their own labor. o
At the same time that slave owners laid claim to enslaved people's labor or
bodies, the law imposed legal duties on slaves."' For example, an enslaved
82
Thus, the law
person who committed murder was punished accordingly.'
treated slaves "for some purposes as if [they] were not a person," but not for
84
rendered them
others.1 83 Robbing enslaved people of full legal personhood'
1.

177.

See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH,

1780-1861, at 1, 7 (1999) (introducing personal liberty laws expressing Northern states' opposition to
federal pro-slavery policy).
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BEST, THE FUGITIVE'S PROPERTIES: LAW AND THE POETICS OF
178.
POSSESSION 12 (2004).

179.

See id at 8-9.

180.

See id See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT 19 (C. B. Macpherson ed.,

Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1689) ("[E]very man has a property in his own person .... The labour of
his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.").
181. See BEST, supra note 178, at 12.
18 2. Id.
183. Id
184. See Meredith M. Render, The Law ofthe Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549,583 (2013).
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ineligible to receive beneficence; they could not be rescued within the
government's interpretation of prevailing law. 85
Denying enslaved persons legal personhood and then prohibiting their
rescue directly promoted slave owners' property rights. Congress recognized
these property rights through the Fugitive Slave Clause. Found in Article IV,
Clause 2, Section 3 of the Constitution, the Fugitive Slave Clause states:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall
be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour
may be due.' 86
Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 (FSA of 1793) to implement the
Fugitive Slave Clause,18 7 thus implicitly interpreting the clause as an
"affirmative constitutional guarantee of the slaveholder's property right of
recapture."' In implementing this "broadest reading" of the Fugitive Slave
Clause,1 89 the FSA of 1793 created a system of civil remedies for slave
owners. 190
Half a century later, Congress redoubled its efforts to preserve slavery by
prohibiting rescue and requiring private citizens to assist in the return of alleged
fugitive persons. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (FSA of 1850) created a
summary process in the federal courts for slave owners to recapture alleged
"fugitive person[s]," along with an elaborate scheme of criminal remedies.'91
Specifically, Section 6 of the FSA of 1850 authorized "such reasonable force and
restraint as may be necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to take and
remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory whence he or she may
have escaped as aforesaid," but prohibited the admission of testimony of the
alleged fugitive person in any proceeding under the Act.1 92 Section 7 of the FSA
of 1850 prohibited individuals from "knowingly and willingly obstruct[ing],
hinder[ing], or prevent[ing]" a "claimant" from recapturing a fugitive person;
from rescuing or attempting to rescue a fugitive person; aiding, abetting, or

185. See COVER, supra note 16, at 6 (previewing argument that "the law's content is frequently
unclear," and that judges have a role in determining which interpretations become law). This fact
complicates the common narrative that enslaved people were "dehumanized." See Walter Johnson, To
Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice, Bos. REV. (Feb. 20, 2018),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/walter-johnson-to-remake-the-world [https://perma.cc/C4VR-BR72].
186. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
187. Act ofFeb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864).
188. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress's Power to Enforce
ConstitutionalRights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 163-64 (2004)
(discussing the FSA of 1793).
189. Id. at 164.
190. Id. at 164-67.
191. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (repealed 1864); see also Kaczorowski,
supra note 188, at 191-93 (discussing the FSA of 1850).
192.
9 Stat. at 463.
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assisting a fugitive person in escape; or harboring or concealing a fugitive
person.'

93

In addition to prohibiting the rescue of "fugitive persons," the FSA of 1850
further authorized federal officials to enlist the aid of "bystanders, or posse
comitatus of the proper county, when necessary to ensure a faithful observance
of the Fugitive Slave Clause and this statute." 1 94 Under the doctrine of posse
comitatus, which remains the law in some form in all fifty states, 19 5 the citizenry
possesses a latent obligation to uphold the law-and when law enforcement
cannot effectively execute their enforcement obligations, they may call upon the
private citizenry to assist.' 9 6 In the antebellum era, this doctrine effectively
imposed a duty on private citizens to rescue human property.1 9 7 Thus, federal
statutes in the nineteenth century not only criminalized the rescue of persons
escaping from slavery but also imposed a duty to recapture those same persons
deemed property. Here as well, the law of rescue privileged property owners. 19 8
Those prosecuted under Section 7 of the FSA of 1850 exploited the tools
of the state-court system to achieve equitable results (even if only fleetingly),
such as writs of habeas corpus' 99 and the state court's more robust procedural
safeguards.2 00 In state court, rescuers could develop the "testimony of the alleged
fugitive" or submit documents establishing facts regarding the alleged fugitive
to use in the FSA summary process. 2 0 1 The state court also offered possibilities,
such as the appointment of a guardian ad litern in the case of an alleged child
fugitive, that ultimately "could prolong the entire matter to the point where a
rescue might be made, a purchase might be negotiated, or a witness might be
found to help the fugitive's case." 2 02 Through these methods, rescuers routinely
used various procedural devices within the system to achieve a just outcome in

193. Id. § 7, 9 Stat. at 464. Later in this Article, I will address the similar language used in 8
U.S.C. § 1324 (2018), the statute prohibiting the smuggling and harboring of undocumented migrants.
194. Kaczorowski, supra note 188, at 191(discussing the FSA of 1850 and quoting Section 5).
195. See David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff Armed Citizens
Summoned to the Aid ofLaw Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 app. (2015) (listing
stateposse comitatus statutes in each of the fifty states).
196. See Kaczorowski, supra note 188, at 191, 238 (analyzing the application of the doctrine of
posse comitatus in the Fugitive Slave Acts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
197. See id.
198. Southern slaveholders have long been understood as occupying the elite "master class" in
antebellum America. See MATTHEW KARP, THIS VAST SOUTHERN EMPIRE 4-5 (2016) (discussing
slaveholding elites' dominance in the federal government and over foreign policy in the nineteenth
century).
199. See CovER, supra note 16, at 184; MORRIs, supra note 177, at 9-11 (discussing
abolitionists' use ofhabeas corpus and the writ ofpersonal replevin to skirt recapture of alleged enslaved
persons who had escaped from a slave jurisdiction). For a discussion of habeas corpus's equitable roots,
see Erica Hashimoto, Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage ofHabeas, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 139, 150-151
(2014).
200. See COVER, supra note 16, at 184.
201. Id.
202. Id
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an individual case, thus revealing that not all seemingly prohibited rescue is
necessarily illegal.
Rescuers and abolitionists agitated for and then invoked an alternative set
of laws to legitimate their work as well. Northern states opposed federal law by
passing a range of personal liberty laws securing some measure of freedom to
blacks in nineteenth century America. 2 03 Pennsylvania passed the first of these
laws in 1826, which explicitly rejected "the idea of voluntary cooperation" with
the federal Fugitive Slave Act. 210 New York passed a similar law aimed at
restraining "the kidnapping of free [blacks] ."205 States thus worked to alter the
application and impact of federal law in their jurisdictions. Although the
Supreme Court ended the era of state experimentation in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,206 these state personal liberty laws attempting to legalize the
rescue of blacks reveal the instability of prohibitions on rescue. 2 07
2.

Economic History and Structure ofHarboringLaws

Over a century later, the government prosecuted another set of rescuers:
participants in the sanctuary movement, a faith-based movement to provide
refuge to Central American asylum seekers fleeing brutal regimes that had
acquired power largely due to U.S. foreign policy in the region. 208 Sanctuary
workers believed that international human rights law required the United States
to provide refuge, and that the government violated the law by denying asylum
to these refugees. 209 Sanctuary workers further believed that private persons had
an obligation to house, clothe, and feed asylum seekers, as well as conceal them
from the authorities, even if domestic law criminalized such assistance.2 10
Sanctuary workers saw themselves as rescuers because asylum seekers
faced not only the immediate distress of lacking basic needs but also, absent a
grant of asylum or other relief, a prolonged state of crisis.2 1 ' The threat of
deportation to lands where asylum seekers would face violence or death
constituted a crisis calling for emergency aid. 2 12 With the government invoking
the rule of law and the need to guard against the purported economic- and
security-related harms associated with unauthorized migration, 213 the conflict

203. See MORRIS, supra note 177, at 45-46.
204. Id at 46.
205. Id at 53 (citation omitted).
206. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
207. See MORRIS, supra note 177, at 58 (describing increasing "sectional tensions" and
proslavery and antislavery view of personal liberty laws as embodying "vital sacrifices of principles").
208. See GARCIA, supra note 25, at 104 (describing sanctuary workers' belief that "they were
answering a higher call" in aiding Central American asylum seekers).
209. See Cook, supra note 27, at 583.
210. See id.
211. See Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity
Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 119, 133 (1993).
212. See id.
213. See Ray, supra note 39, at 1258.
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between the government and humanitarian activists could not be reconciled.
Instead, the government prosecuted the sanctuary workers. 2 14
These prosecutions have prompted commentators to analogize the fugitive
slave era's Underground Railroad to modem rescue efforts with respect to
undocumented immigrants, 2 15 but such a comparison has many flaws.216 For one,
enslaved persons had no choice about their place of residence. 2 17 In addition, the
consequences of the legal classification of humans as property, including the
brutal physical attacks on enslaved persons' bodies, have few parallels. 218
Nonetheless, the federal prohibitions on rescue in the two settings share key
features. 219 Specifically, the history of the federal law criminalizing immigrant
harboring offers a rich example of the law of rescue's preoccupation with the
economic interests, alternatingly, of U.S. laborers and elites such as Texas
agricultural growers. 220
Congress criminalized various forms of assistance to undocumented
migrants in the early twentieth century, but due to wartime labor shortages,
administrative agencies waived formal immigration inspection for large numbers
of Mexican farmworkers, and the government rarely enforced the statute for
many decades. 22 1 As Professor Deborah Kang has explained, during that period,
the U.S.-Mexico border was more than just a geographic "line" between two
countries. Professor Kang argues that, as immigration enforcement waxed and
waned in response to the demands of various interest groups, "the line" was a

214. See GARCIA, supra note 25, at 106 (describing Operation Sojourner of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which led to "the indictment of sixteen sanctuary
workers").
215. See, e.g., Jake Halpern, The UndergroundRailroadfor Refugees, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/13/the-underground-railroad-for-refugees
2017),
[https://perma.cc/FU6W-SRKC]; see generally Karla Mari McKanders, ImmigrationEnforcement and
the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring theirSimilarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REv. 921 (2012).
See McKanders, supra note 215, at 923-24; Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
216.
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUm. L. REv. 1833, 1837 & n.18 (discussing reasons
for skepticism about the comparison, including the involuntary nature of slavery and the legal
classification of enslaved persons as property); Fred Schwarz, Is DeportingImmigrants the Same as
Returning
Fugitive
Slaves?,
NAT'L
REv.
(May
4,
2018),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/california-sanctuary-supporters-not-like-fugitive-slaverescuers/ [https://permacc/5GDZ-Y5NG].
217. See Neuman, supranote 216; Schwarz, supra note 216.
See MORRIS, supranote 177, at 153 (describing the fate of Thomas Sims, who was returned
218.
to slavery under the Fugitive Slave Act and whipped publicly thirty-nine times upon recapture). In
addition, scholars comparing the two eras have focused principally on their shared experience of failed
federalism. See, e.g., McKanders, supra note 215, at 940.
219. See generallyMcKanders, supranote 215.
220. Others have extensively documented the explicit racial animus toward Mexican immigrants
that drove the passage of the harboring law. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and
Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2010) (discussing "racist and exclusionary
impulses" evident in lawmakers' stated views of unauthorized migrants). My aim here is to call attention
to underappreciated economic interests also implicated.
221.

See S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE US-

MEXICO BORDER, 1917-1954, at 21 (2017).
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site of tremendous administrative discretion, at times extending into interior
spaces. 222 Although commercial interests favored lax enforcement of
immigration controls, the American Federation of Labor favored stricter
enforcement to prevent the increased supply of labor from diminishing wages. 223
The Immigration Act of 1917 created criminal penalties for the smuggling and
harboring of undocumented migrants, 224 giving the government an additional
tool to punish migrants as desired, but the government at all levels used its
discretion to avoid interfering with incoming migrant labor for many years. 225
Specifically, prosecutors and federal judges "demonstrated leniency" towards
defendants charged with immigrant smuggling due in part to their sympathy for
"farmers and ranchers." 226
Congress adopted the modem prohibitions on immigrant harboring in the
McCarran-Walter Act, also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA). 227 INA preserved a familiar mix of harsh nativism, 228 fear of
Mexican labor competition, 2 2 9 and pro-business provisions. 230 "'[L]abor groups
and liberal congressmen"' sought stringent restrictions on Mexican migration to
protect American workers, and the updated provisions criminalizing various
forms of assistance to unauthorized migrants reflected this stringency. 23 1 At the
same time, the statute expressly declined to criminalize the employment of
undocumented migrants as a form of harboring. 232 This was known openly as the
222. See id at 37 (noting that Border Patrol's response to local defiance transformed the border
from a line "into a space or from an international boundary into a legal jurisdiction").
223.

See id. at 26; JuAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF

MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 122 (1980) (describing organized labor's opposition
to so-called "illegals" based on the belief that they "depressed wages and disrupted unionization efforts
by acting as strikebreakers").
224. See Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 8, 39 Stat. 874, 880 (repealed 1952) (establishing misdemeanor
liability for harboring an unadmitted immigrant).
225. See KANG, supra note 221, at 16-17 (describing federal officials' use of the Act to "expel
suspected alien enemies and subversives throughout the country"); id. at 20-24 (describing Department
of Labor's consistent efforts to relax restrictions to ensure adequate supply of agricultural workers).
226. Id at 107.
227. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
228. Cf Jain, supra note 220 (noting lawmakers' racial animus evident in the statute's legislative
history).
229. See GARCIA, supra note 223, at 122; KANG, supra note 221, at 107-08; cf Jeremy Waldron,
Immigration:A Lockean Approach 15 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 15-37, 2015), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=26527 10
[https://perma.cc/P7SZ-BP5X] (noting the illegitimacy of seeking to lessen "the number of one's
economic competitors" by restricting immigration).
230. See GARCIA, supra note 223, at 131 (noting that "employing illegal entrants did not
constitute harboring" under the McCarran-Walter Act); cf KELLY LYTLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRA!: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 155 (2010) (discussing farmers and ranchers in Texas, "the
region's elite," complaining to Congress about immigration enforcement).
231. See KANG,supra note 221, at 108.
232. See GARCIA, supra note 223, at 131; KANG, supra note 221, at 45. Instead, Congress
imposed criminal penalties on employers decades later through Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986.
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23 3
and
"Texas Proviso," a nod to the "delegation [that] demand[ed] its inclusion"
23 4
the
reduced
also
Congress
farmworkers.
agribusiness's reliance on Mexican
235
law
the
Thus,
Border Patrol budget to further protect "agribusiness interests."
has tolerated or even encouraged some forms of unauthorized presence-to the
extent that it benefitted commercial interests-since its inception, but it also
23 6
adopted strict criminal penalties for those who assist undocumented migrants.
Just as in the era of the Fugitive Slave Acts, elite economic interests are
enmeshed with racial hierarchy, although not without complications and
exceptions. 23 7 These economic interests have often valued black and brown
238
bodies only as units of labor, if not property-subjects of extreme regulation.
Congress designed INA's criminal provisions to curb the incentives for
migrants to enter, move about, or remain in the country in violation of its
immigration laws. 239 In its modern form, the statute prohibits transporting,
harboring, or smuggling an unauthorized migrant, or inducing or encouraging an
24 0
The concern for
unauthorized migrant to remain in the United States.
incentives shapes enforcement and interpretation of the "harboring provision,"
which prohibits harboring, concealing, or shielding an unauthorized noncitizen
from detection. 24 1 Because Congress did not define "harboring," federal courts

233.

The

Bracero

Program,

RURAL

MIGRATION

NEWS

(Apr.

2003),

https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=10 [https://perma.cc/HQE2-2M44].
234. See KANG,supra note 221, at 45.
235. See id. at 142.
See id. at 55 (describing local economic pressure for laxer border enforcement as a precursor
236.
to adjustment of status, a pathway to permanent residency without requiring a migrant to apply for a visa
from the migrant's home country).
237. See Karla Mari McKanders, supra note 215, at 924; cf Kevin R. Johnson, Sweet Home
Alabama? Immigration and Civil Rights in the "New" South, 64 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 22, 22 (2011),
3 2
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/ / 011/12/64-SLRO-22.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RV6D-J532] (drawing similarities between anti-immigrant state laws in the twentyfirst century and "civil rights issues raised by Jim Crow for African-Americans").
238. The Black Codes adopted during and after Reconstruction resemble the strict regulation of
unauthorized migrants in cities like Hazleton, Pennsylvania, that prohibited migrants from renting
apartments or entering into contracts. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013)
(striking down on preemption grounds municipal ordinances barring landlords from renting apartments
to undocumented migrants, among other restrictions), and Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2013) (striking down similar ordinance on preemption grounds),
with Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming similar ordinance), and ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 199-201 (1988) (describing infringements on freed blacks' freedom of
contract, among other restrictions, and use of vagrancy statutes to punish unemployment). A preemption
analysis, however, elides the fundamental critique that the laws regulate people like they are simply units

of labor.
239.

Although entering the United States without inspection is a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1325(a) (2018), mere unlawful presence is a civil immigration violation rather than a crime. See
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (defining unlawful presence as a civil rather than a
criminal offense).
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2018). Under these provisions, the government must prove that the
defendant knew or should have known of the noncitizen's unauthorized status.
241. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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have interpreted the term differently.2 42 Some interpret the harboring provision
to criminalize any kind of assistance to unauthorized noncitizens, including
"simple sheltering." 2 4 3 Others require more, such as acts of concealment, or,
absent such acts, "strong measures to keep [unauthorized noncitizens] here" like
free housing, food, and other inducements. 244 Courts engage in fact-intensive
inquiries, 245 and the degree to which the assistance lures the unauthorized
noncitizen to stay or facilitates their prolonged illegal presence appears to weigh
heavily in courts' analysis. 246 Thus, those who employ unauthorized noncitizens
are often found guilty of harboring their workers when they provide free housing
and other necessities to facilitate their workers' continued presence; 247 in
contrast, those who charge for such amenities per the usual course of business
generally avoid liability. 2 4 8
Again, this approach reveals a preoccupation with incentives. A defendant
who merely charges the going rate for a room rental is not subsidizing the
unauthorized migrant's continued presence. Instead, the defendant is exacting
from the unauthorized migrant the "market" price, which in theory the migrant
would have to pay regardless of the defendant's offer. Thus, the defendant in
such a case makes the migrant's stay no more or less painful; their act leaves
existing incentives untouched. 249 If the migrant does not rent a market-rate room
from the first landlord, they will rent one from the second. The substitutability
of market goods drives this conclusion.
On the other hand, a charitable defendant who donates or heavily subsidizes
essential items like food, water, and shelter could conceivably alter a migrant's
242. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 2012) (advocating for
a context-specific interpretation of "harbor"); United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428, 430 (9th
Cir. 1976) (ultimately defining "harbor" as "afford shelter to").
243.
"JULIE" YIHONG MAO & JAN COLLATZ, NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT'L
LAWYERS GUILD, UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL OFFENSES OF HARBORING TRANSPORTING,

&

SMUGGLING, AND ENCOURAGING UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) 33 (2017) (quoting Acosta de Evans, 531
F.2d
at
430),
https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practiceadvisories/pr/2017 28Sep memo1324a.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT3T-2MKF].
244. See, e.g., United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Costello,
666 F.3d at 1045).
245. MAO & COLLATZ, supra note 243, at 6 ("[C]ourts generally conduct a fact-based,
circumstantial analysis.").
246. Cf Shayak Sarkar,FinancialImmigrationFederalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1561,1602-03 (2019)
(discussing state and municipal incentives and disincentives for immigrants' unauthorized presence).
247. See McClellan, 794 F.3d at 743; United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2009);
Sarkar, supra note 246.
248. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2012); MAO
COLLATZ, supra note 243, at 28. States like California moved years ago to prohibit landlords from
asking prospective tenants about their immigration status. See, e.g., CahforniaFirstState to Prohibit
Anti-Immigrant Rental Ordinances, ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES (Oct. 11, 2007),
https://www.aclusandiego.org/california-first-state-to-prohibit-anti-immigrant-rental-ordinances-aclubusiness-real-estate-leaders-and-civil-rights-groups-applaud-the-bill/ [https://perma.cc/V55D-G3A7].
249. Cf Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050 (rejecting interpretation of harboring to include "simple
sheltering").
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incentives for remaining (and the government's ability to detect their
presence). 25 0 Such a charitable defendant takes "strong measures to keep
[unauthorized noncitizens] here." 251 By easing the migrant's entry into and
presence in the United States, the defendant increases the likelihood that the
migrant will recover from their journey, regain their strength and health, and
continue their unlawful presence-perhaps traveling even deeper into the
252
interior where immigration enforcement officers will struggle to find them.
One could argue, surely, that the landlord who overlooks the unauthorized
status of a prospective tenant for the sake of conducting business is more
culpable than the sanctuary worker who provides life's essentials out of a sense
253
But that intuition focuses on
of shared humanity or solidarity with migrants.
of their conduct; and the
effects
incentive
the
than
rather
purpose
the defendant's
that distorts migrants'
conduct
law is fundamentally organized to punish
incentives, whether that conduct is charitable or for-profit.
Although INA's anti-harboring provisions suggest that unauthorized
presence is an unalloyed "harm," the statute's religion-oriented exception
directly undermines that notion. That exception insulates nonprofit organizations
and their agents from liability if they "encourage, invite, call, allow, or enable"
an unauthorized noncitizen "to perform the vocation of a minister or missionary
for [a] denomination or organization in the United States" that provides the
254
as long as the minister or missionary
minister's or missionary's basic needs,
works as an otherwise uncompensated volunteer and has been a member of the
25 5
This exception recognizes
denomination or organization for at least a year.
250. See, e.g., Ye, 588 F.3d at 417; MAO & COLLATZ, supra note 243, at 13. The Ninth Circuit
has held that a defendant must have "intended to violate the law" to be guilty of harboring. United States
v. Tydingco, 909 F.3d 297, 303-04 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, a sanctuary worker who publicly flouts the
immigration law could be liable despite their charitable intentions, but an individual whose knowledge
of immigration law is hazy might escape liability on that basis.
251. Costello, 666F.3dat 1045.
252. The harboring statute also prohibits "encourage[ing] or induc[ing]" an unauthorized
noncitizen "to come to, enter, or reside in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(AXiv) (2018). The
federal circuit courts are divided as to the constitutionality of the provision. Compare United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 485 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding the provision unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 36 (2019) (Mem.), with United States v. Anderton, 901 F.3d 278,
283 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding the same language sufficiently clear on plain error review), cert. denied,
139 S.Ct 1214 (2019) (Mem.).
253. Cf Angus Grant, The Smuggled and the Smuggler: Exploring the Distinctions Between
MutualAid, HumanitarianRefugee Assistance and PeopleSmuggling in CanadianLaw, REFLAW (June
22, 2016), http://www.reflaw.org/the-smuggled-and-the-smuggler-exploring-the-distinctions-betweenmutual-aid-humanitarian-refugee-assistance-and-people-smuggling-in-canadian-law/
[https://perma.cc/572J-KZQE] (discussing Canadian law's differential treatment of humanitarian aid
and for-profit people-smuggling).
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C). The statute specifies "room, board, travel, medical assistance, and
other basic living expenses." Id.
255. Id. Commentators note that Congress adopted this exception at the behest of members ofthe
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which requires its male members to perform missionary
work, and that the Church has seen a growing population of undocumented adherents. See, e.g., ScottRailton, supranote 29, at 443.
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that providing assistance in the form of food, shelter, and medical expenses to
some unauthorized noncitizens does not cause prohibited harm, or else that the
competing interests of religious organizations outweigh it. Thus, while the law
generally regards unauthorized presence as a trespass 256-the harm being the
very transgression of a boundary 2 5 7-it sometimes treats unauthorized presence
as a nuisance, a harm susceptible to balancing. 25 8
E.

Identifying Common Themes in Laws ofRescue

The project of articulating common themes across disparate regimes of
rescue must consider factors such as the beneficiary's status in the jurisdiction.
The legality of rescue might depend simply on the status of the person being
rescued, not the economic interests at stake. On this view, when someone is
permitted in a jurisdiction, others are free to rescue them; sometimes, such a duty
is mandated if life-threatening danger is likely. On the other hand, when someone
is not permitted in a jurisdiction, people are not free to rescue them.
Unauthorized migrants, like escaped prisoners, 25 9 have no legal right to be where
they are found, let alone the right to be assisted in moving into prohibited
spaces. 260 The same logic animated prosecutions of people who rescued alleged
fugitive slaves. 2 6 1 Thus, this view regards the mix of legal rules regulating rescue
as being based on a person's status within a given jurisdiction, with race and
status correlating to a high degree. 262 But this status-based explanation fails to
account for the full range of rescue regimes within the law. First, the antiharboring law has numerous exceptions, including ones for employers of fewer
than ten unauthorized employees, 263 and for unauthorized migrants who serve in
a mission or ministry. 264 Even though the migrants contemplated in these
provisions entered without inspection, thereby committing a crime, 265 the law
does not criminalize the act of employing them in small numbers or sustaining
256. For a discussion of this "trespass" theory of immigration, see Allegra M. McLeod, The US.
Criminal-ImmigrationConvergence andIts Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 110 (2012).
257. See FEINBERG, supra note 56, at 107.
258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (discussing private
nuisance); 7 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 20:1 (2018) (discussing
nuisance generally and balancing).
259. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 756 (2020) ("Aiding escape"); IDAHO CODE § 18-2501
(2019) ("Rescuing prisoners").
260. Cf Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that an
inadmissible noncitizen "at the border" has no legal right to enter and a noncitizen already present but
with a final order of removal has no legal right to remain).
261. See COVER, supra note 16, at 185.
262. See HERNANDEZ, supra note 230 (describing the U.S. Border Patrol's "racialization of the
legal/illegal divide").
263. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2018) (imposing penalties on the employment of more than ten
unauthorized migrants); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2018) (imposing civil penalties for hiring
unauthorized migrants). But see E-Verify Act of 2019, S. 301, 116th Cong. (2019) (bill proposing
enforcement of work authorization requirements for noncitizens).
264. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C).
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018).
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them with room, board, and other necessities. In these ways, the law decouples
assistance to a person from that person's prior criminal conduct, and rescue is
266
not simply illegal whenever the beneficiary has committed a crime.
Moreover, in the realm of international law, migrants have a legal right to
rescue on the high seas that they lose the moment they disembark and become
unauthorized migrants at the shores of a haven state, wherein their rescue is a
criminal offense. 267 They have every right to be on the high seas, but their
presence there merely precedes or comprises part of a journey to some other
268
Thus, it
territory, one where haven states will regard them as unauthorized.
seems odd to say that vessels must rescue migrants on the high seas because the
migrants are legally present when they are, in fact, imminent outlaws.
The law of rescue's revealed preference for the interests of property owners
and other economic elites suggests that this area of law-often understood to
promote beneficence or at least the freedom to act beneficently-may not in fact
adequately protect these important values. When it comes to prohibited rescue
specifically, the law disregards the rescuer's liberty to engage in rescue and the
beneficiary's dignity at stake in a rescue. Using the specific setting of migrant
rescue, this Article now turns to the normative case for permitting currentlyprohibited rescue.

II.
THE NEW LAW OF IGRANT RESCUE

The law of rescue has an economic orientation that generally privileges
property-owning beneficiaries and third parties, but its logic does not reduce to
a single principle, interest, or value. It reflects some non-economic concerns: for
example, the rescuer's liberty to choose whether to engage in rescue, as
illustrated in tort law's general lack of a duty to rescue. Various Good Samaritan
protections also suggest that the law seeks to promote rescue and protect
rescuers, even while retaining rescue's voluntary character. The law's economic
orientation, however, tends to dominate these other considerations. This Section
sketches a framework for thinking about rescue generally and prohibited rescue
specifically, seeking to amplify these considerations. Under this framework, this
Section argues that current prohibitions on migrant rescue lack sufficient
justification. The framework developed in this Section, however, does not justify
all forms of prohibited rescue.

266. Notably, aiding and abetting is distinct from assisting unauthorized migrants after they have
effectuated an entry. See 3 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 17:51 (Feb. 2020). Unlawful presence itself is
only a civil violation rather than a crime. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) ("As
a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States."). Thus,
facilitating unlawful presence alone (rather than entry) is not "aiding and abetting" a crime.
See GALLAGHER & DAVID, supranote 154, at44-45.
267.
268. See id
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Taking inspiration from the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge 2 6 9 this Section offers a three-part balancing test of sorts-a mix of
rights and utility. This framework considers the rescuer's liberty to engage in
rescue, the beneficiary's need for rescue, and the potential third-party harm
flowing from a consensual rescue. This framework recasts the concept of the
need for rescue as the beneficiary's "dignity" in order to capture the range of
fundamental rights and interests at stake.
A.

The Meaning ofMigrantRescue

Migrant rescue refers to the rendering of humanitarian aid to migrants in
distress along a national border. 270 Generally, distress can be acute,
encompassing medical emergencies such as dehydration or injured limbs, 2 7 1 or
diffuse and structural, such as the need for protection from deportation to a
persecuting country. 272 These distinct forms of distress gave rise to a conception
of rescue that animated the original sanctuary movement and its newer
incarnation.
The original sanctuary movement in the 1980s responded to both sets of
dangers-imminent and structural-based on the movement's understanding of
the brutality of Central American governments, its assessment of the content and
contours of international human rights law, and its conclusion that the U.S.
government had violated such law. 2 73 International human rights law protects
core rights relating to "life, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, and freedom
from state-imposed harm," 2 74 and sanctuary workers believed that protection of
such "basic rights" could never be illegal. 2 75 Central American governments
visited horrors upon their people, but the U.S. government rejected the claims of
nearly all Central American asylum seekers during this era.276 This drove
sanctuary workers to "active[ly] and visibl[y]" 2 7 7 resist immigration
enforcement, which in turn followed from their commitment to live in
community with one another and implement (their understanding of) "the
law." 2 7 8
269. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
270. See About No More Deaths, No MORE DEATHS, https://nomoredeaths.org/about-no-moredeaths/ [https://perma.cc/PZ8P-JGU8] (describing "year-round humanitarian presence in the deserts of
southwestern Arizona").
271. See id. (describing emergency medical aid to migrants in the desert).
272. See Jim CORBETr, GOATWALKING 163 (1991) (discussing disagreement within the
sanctuary movement and characterizing one possible response to arriving refugees as serving as "refugee
medics" but implying that a deeper level of commitment to refugees was needed).
273. See Cook, supranote 27, at 583.
274. Ray, supranote 39, at 1263.
275. See CORBETr, supranote 272, at 104.
276. GARCIA, supra note 25, at 85.
277. CORBETr, supra note 272, at 78.
278. See id. at 100 ("'The law' as right is a single, intra-active, evolving order. 'Laws' or statutes
are chronically in need of interpretation, testing, and adjudication to determine how and whether they fit
into the law.").
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This capacious conception of rescue has waned over the years, and
individuals and organizations engaged in migrant rescue today have disavowed
evasion of immigration enforcement, focusing instead on prevention of migrant
deaths. 279 Humanitarian organizations such as Humane Borders, Tucson
Samaritans, and No More Deaths contend that their work is "legal," and that the
mere provision of humanitarian aid is not a crime. 280 But this is consistent with
the view that evading immigration enforcement would be a crime. Participants
in the new sanctuary movement appear to share this view. At his trial for
violating INA's anti-harboring provisions, for example, Scott Warren testified
that he never counseled the migrants he encountered on how to evade
immigration enforcement. 28 1 He conceded that federal harboring law has the
force of "law," impliedly rejecting the original sanctuary movement's view that
evading immigration enforcement was itself lawful-the government's
interpretation of the harboring statute notwithstanding. 28 2 Such a focus resonates
with international legal protections for life and bodily integrity, and reaffirms the
special status of emergency medical treatment as manifested in other areas of
federal law, such as requirements for hospitals to provide emergency medical
care to all persons, regardless of immigration status.2 83
A conception of rescue any narrower than this, however, would nullify
humanitarian aid by authorizing less assistance than required to sustain migrants
walking through dangerous terrain. The federal government advanced such a
restricted conception of humanitarian aid in the first prosecution of Scott Walker,
wherein prosecutors argued that the alleged provision of maps, flashlights, and
backpacks to unauthorized migrants would exceed any permissible humanitarian
aid. 2 84 However, such a view is mistaken. Through official policy, the
government has closed off less dangerous paths to entry. 285 As a result, asylum
seekers find themselves on dangerous, deadly trails. Without the means to

279. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 49 (describing individual humanitarian, John Hunter, who aimed
solely at providing water without assisting migrants in evasion or challenging broader immigration
policies). This narrower conception of distress might support using the necessity defense in some cases,
pursuant to which a defendant can defeat liability for committing a crime to avoid a greater harm. See,
e.g., United States v. Perdomo-Espana, 522 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2008). The defense, however, is
narrow and requires proof that "there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law." Id See also
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193,197 (9th Cir. 1991) (characterizing the elements of the necessity
defense as "strict" and stating that "society receives no benefit from the criminal conduct" if the
"criminal act cannot abate the threatened harm" (citation omitted)).
280. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 65.
281. See Paul Ingram, No More Deaths Trial: Warren Testifies, ProsecutorsCallFinalWitness,
2019)
6,
(June
TuCsONSENTINEL.COM
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/060619 nmd_warrentrial/no-more-deaths-trial-warrentestifies-prosecutors-call-final-witness/ [https://penna.cc/6M8R-A7JN] (summarizing testimony).
282. See id.
283. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2018).
284. See Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, supra note 9, at 4.
285.

(1994).

See U.S. BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN: 1994 AND BEYOND, at 6
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navigate the terrain, they risk imminent physical harm or even death. 286
Humanitarian aid, properly understood, encompasses assistance in navigating
the desert geography. 287
B.

The Values ofMigrantRescue

Permitting the rescue of unauthorized migrants stands to promote both
liberty and dignity. Giving the rescuer the freedom to engage in acts of rescue
for a willing beneficiary, absent serious third-party harm, honors both the
rescuer's liberty and the beneficiary's dignity. In addition to respecting an
individual's choice not to rescue, as in tort law, the law ought to go further by
respecting a rescuer's right to engage in rescue under certain circumstances.
1.

Rescuer's Liberty

A rescuer's freedom to engage in rescue follows from the freedom of
association. Apart from having a constitutional valence 288 and widespread
recognition in international law, 2 89 the freedom of association is also a moral
value. Free associations encompass a range of relationships, including those
within families, schools, or clubs and those among friends. 2 90 They involve
coming together with one another for a shared purpose. 2 9 1 At times, individuals
and groups have invoked the freedom of association as a means to promote
equality 292 and solidarity, 293 but just as often parties rely on it to exclude outgroups. 294 The freedom of association also shapes debates about migration, with
both advocates of open borders and exclusionary immigration policy appealing
to associative freedom.

286. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 63 (describing No More Deaths base camp provisions).
287. See id.
288. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978,
991 (2011) (discussing assembly and association as "essential components of political activism").
289. See Rights to Freedom ofPeacefulAssembly and ofAssociation, OFF. HIGH COMM'R HUM.
RTs.,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ssues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/IntemationalStandards.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JY4H-P6VF] (cataloguing international standards on rights to freedom of assembly
and of association).
290. See Freedom of Association, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 3, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edulentries/freedom-association/ [https://perma.cc/R93L-QNMC].
291.
See id. (citing John Stuart Mill).
292.
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452, 460 (1958) (recounting the
NAACP's efforts in Alabama to support black students "seeking admission to the state university" and
the Montgomery bus boycott, which prompted the State Attorney General to sue in equity to obtain their
membership list, the forced production of which, the Court held, would infringe members' right to the
freedom of association).
293. See Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as
Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2057-59 (2018) (describing the central role of the freedom of
association in combatting "low wages, rising economic inequality, declining union density,
criminalization of immigration, and outsourcing and subcontracting").
294. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,656 (2000) (holding that the forced inclusion
of a gay scout master in the Boy Scouts would interfere with the organization's anti-gay message).
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In his defense of exclusionary immigration policy, Professor Christopher
Heath Wellman argues that individuals, groups, and even polities enjoy a
freedom of association, including the freedom not to associate. 295 Starting with
the freedom to associate in the context of marriage, Wellman argues that having
the freedom to marry someone does not require any individual to agree to
marriage; after all, the courted individual can decline. 296 Professor Sarah Song
similarly describes marriage as a right "whose exercise depends on finding
cooperative partners with whom to exercise the right." 297 Just like individuals
contemplating marriage, the argument goes, associational groups should enjoy
latitude to associate or not with persons however they see fit, and so should
states. According to Wellman, a polity's freedom of association is essential for
its "self-determination."

298

Libertarians, however, also invoke the freedom of association-but at the
299
individual level-and they arrive at arguments in favor of open borders.
Specifically, libertarians appeal to citizens' right to "dominion" over their private
property, including the right to hire workers of their choosing. Based on their
right to dominion over their land, the argument goes, individual citizens should
dictate who enters the country and who stays, the polity's preferences
notwithstanding. 300 Although the state also has a right to control its "political
territory," the individual landowner's right should prevail. 301 Such a freedom for
302
individual citizens would severely limit a state's right to "self-determination."
303
To avert anarchy, a polity's
Wellman sees this leading to anarchy.
associational choices.3 04 In
individual
constrain
should
freedom of association
his view, the libertarian position requires some explanation of why the
individual's freedom of association should take precedence over the polity's, or
why an individuals' right to dominion over their property overrides the polity's
right to control its territory. 305 Not finding one, Wellman finds the libertarian
defense of open borders unpersuasive. 306

295.
296.

See Wellman, supra note 24, at 109-13.
See id

297.

SARAH SONG, IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 105 (2019).

298. Wellman, supra note 24, at 110-11. Song, however, critiques Wellman's reliance on the
freedom of association, in part because the state is not an intimate association. SONG, supra note 297, at
44-45.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN AND PHILIP COLE, DEBATING THE ETHICS OF
299.
IMMIGRATION: IS THERE A RIGHT TO EXCLUDE? 79 (2011).

300. See id. at 80 (noting libertarians' view that "restricting immigration ... conflicts with the
property rights of insiders who might want to invite various foreigners to visit their land").
301. See id. at 80-81.
302. See Wellman, supra note 24, at 133.
303. Id at 131.
304. See id.
305. Id at 132.
306. See id at 137. Libertarians are not the sole advocates for open borders. Egalitarians also
argue for open borders based on the notion of moral luck and that no one chooses the country of their
birth. See JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 226-28 (2013); Wellman, supra note 24,
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The kind of migrant rescue contemplated here does not assist migrants in
transgressing a national boundary illegally, which has already happened by the
time of rescue. It also does not amount to admitting migrants for membership to
the polity. Instead, migrant rescue constitutes an interstitial association. Assume
that a polity has a freedom of association that constrains individual associational
choices about whom to admit or exclude. And assume that migrants' need for
entry,3 07 or a history of war or colonial dealings between the haven state and the
countries from which migrants hail,3 08 does not overcome this right to exclude.
Even then, the freedom of association, understood as a moral value, supports
migrant rescue. In such a setting, the individual rescuer seeks not to admit a
noncitizen or determine the length of their stay. Instead, the rescuer seeks merely
to prevent the death of that person. 309 Interstitial association of this kind does not
impede a polity's overall right to self-determination. On its own, rescue does not
threaten sovereignty premised on membership and shared governance.
Wellman's second set of arguments is also consistent with an associational
right to humanitarian rescue. Specifically, Wellman notes the minimal burden of
not being allowed to invite a foreigner onto one's property, and the costs to
"compatriots." 310 With respect to humanitarian aid in the desert, as opposed to a
decision to admit the person for permanent residence, the force of these reasons
is diminished or even reversed. Indeed, the burden of being prohibitedfrom
helping is high for potential rescuers because their conscience, religious practice,
or interpretation of human rights law might compel them to intervene, and their
conduct would be laudable (and lawful) if the person in distress were not a
migrant.31 1 Moreover, the costs to compatriots of the migrant not dying are also
low, 312 for the rescuer is not deciding whether the migrant will be admitted for
permanent residence. Ultimately, the polity's "right to exclude," whether real or
imagined, is consistent with permitting individuals to engage in migrant rescue
and form interstitial associations that fall short of admission decisions.
2.

Beneficiary's Dignity

Justifying rescue exclusively based on the liberty interests of rescuers,
however, fails to consider whether prospective beneficiaries seek, want, or need

at 119-30. However, the egalitarian argument is not based on the freedom of association, and thus, not
relevant to this liberty-based discussion.
307. See SONG, supra note 297, at 121-22.
308. See E. Tendayi Achuime, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REv. 1509, 1509, 1522
(2019) (arguing that individual "so-called economic migrants" can help achieve nation-state
decolonization through their "personal pursuit of enhanced self-determination").
[https://perma.cc/7A4Y-2GWD]
BORDERs,
https://humaneborders.org/
309. HUMANE
(describing mission of "sav[ing] desperate people from a horrible death by dehydration and exposure").
310. Wellman, supra note 24, at 133.
311.
See Cook, supra note 27, at 582 (describing migrant rescuers' appeal to higher law, based
on religion and secular beliefs, to justify their work).
312. See Wellman, supra note 24, at 133.
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rescue.313 Most people presumably would want to receive lifesaving aid, and the
law at times treats rescue as involving an implied contract for lifesaving
services.3 14 Some forms of rescue, however, can impose harm.315 Thus, consent
to rescue cannot always be presumed.
Apart from consent, the law must consider whether rescue advances the
interests and respects the capacities of the beneficiary, especially when involving
children or others incapable of providing legal consent. Does it protect their
rights and promote their agency?3 16 Many concepts of dignity appear in
constitutional law,3 17 and scholars have conceived of dignity as a jurisprudential
concept, a quality of a rights-based legal system, and a trait of rights-bearers
themselves. 318 With respect to beneficiaries of rescue, dignity has its greatest
appeal when understood as respecting a person's humanity and guarding against
their humiliation and subordination. 319 Although the Supreme Court has
developed the anti-subordination conception of dignity in cases implicating gay
rights and reproductive rights, it has also expressed concern about the perpetual
320
subordination of the children of undocumented migrants.
On this conception of dignity, migrant rescue promotes dignity. Rescuers
providing humanitarian aid protect migrants' rights relating to life and bodily
integrity. They further show respect for migrants' humanity by preventing their

313.

On the dangers of a stylized understanding of rescuers and victims in the immigration

setting, see Sabrina Balgamwalla, Trafficking in Narratives: Conceptualizingand Recasting Victims,
Offenders, andRescuers in the War on Human Trafficking, 94 DENV. L. REv. 1 (2016).

314. See Albert, supra note 101, at 119 (discussing implied agency as basis for rescuer's
recovery).
315. Take, for example, parents seeking to "rescue" LGBTQ youth through so-called
"conversion therapy." Even if parents believe they are saving the bodies or souls of their children, their
freedom to engage in perceived beneficence imposes a range ofharms and humiliations on their children,
including depression, anxiety, and heightened risks of homelessness and suicide. Thus, such conversion
therapy cannot be said to promote the child's dignity. See The Lies and Dangersof Efforts to Change

Sexual Orientationor Gender Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-liesand-dangers-of-reparative-therapy [https://perma.cc/BRD7-CGZD]. For discussion of an "objective"
conception of harm in immigration law, see Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a Russian lesbian could prove the persecution element of her asylum claim when the
Russian government institutionalized her and subjected her to electroshock treatment "in an effort to
change her sexual orientation" because a persecutor's belief that the harm "is 'good for' his victim does
not make it any less painful to the victim[] or . . remove the conduct from the statutory definition of
persecution").
316. I do not regard beneficiaries as necessarily having a "right" to dignity-promoting rescue;
instead, I am concerned with possible justifications for permitting rather than requiring currentlyprohibited rescue.
317.

See AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 205-48(2015); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts ofDignity in ConstitutionalLaw,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183 (2011); Leslie Meltzer Henry, The JurisprudenceofDignity, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 169, 171-72 (2011).
318. See JEREMY WALDRON, supra note 23, at 49 (2012)
319. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity andthe PoliticsofProtection:Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
320. See Note, Equal Dignity - Heeding Its Call, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2019)
(discussing anti-subordination rationale of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
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deaths, which often occur under degrading or humiliating circumstances. 32 1
Beyond this, rescue respects migrants' agency in a system rigged against them.
International refugee law creates a right against return or refoulement to
countries of persecution,3 22 but it also poses a fundamental challenge to
accessing that protection: migrants must somehow effectuate an entry into a
haven state in order to enjoy the protection of non-refoulement. International
refugee law expressly contemplates asylum seekers entering haven states
irregularly, 323 because haven states offer almost no legal paths to entry. 324
Combined with recent developments in the United States leading to routine
prosecution for irregular entry 32 5 and family separation, 326 the promise of

protection rings hollow. Moreover, even if a migrant succeeds in reaching a port
of entry, under the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols, 327 the U.S.
government will return the migrant to a border town in Mexico-usually a site
of murder, rape, and other horrors-while awaiting a hearing. 328 These policies
amplify the forces that simultaneously lure and repel migrants. 329 Permitting
those migrants who do cross the border to survive the journey is the least the law
can do.

321. See Rob O'Dell, What Dead Pigs Can Teach Us About Missing Migrant Bodies in the
Desert, KTVB (July 5, 2018) https//www.ktvb.com/article/news/nation-now/what-dead-pigs-canteach-us-about-missing-migrant-bodies-in-the-desert/465-728a855a-0228-4bl4-8d7e-fec7l322cd9b
[https://permacc/3B4K-C5ZW] (describing scavenging of migrant bodies in the Arizona desert).
322. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
323. Seeidart.31.
324. See Shalini Bhargava Ray, Optimal Asylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1215, 1231
(2013); DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD, REFUGE BEYOND REACH: How RICH DEMOCRACIES REPEL

ASYLUM SEEKERS, 1-10 (2019) (describing haven states' efforts to avoid their legal obligation of nonrefoulement by repelling asylum seekers and preventing their entry into haven states' territories).
325. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 34.
326. See Family Separation:By the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrantsrights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/family-separation [https://perma.cc/J7DC-F3VS].
327. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofHomeland See., Migration Protection Protocols (Jan. 24,2019),
[https://perma.cc/FP33-E4BT].
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols
The Supreme Court granted the government's request to stay the Ninth Circuit's injunction of this
program, thus permitting it to take effect Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432
(S. CL March 11, 2020) (mem.).
328. Debbie Nathan, Trump's "Remain in Mexico" Policy Exposes Migrants to Rape,
Kidnaping, and Murder in Dangerous Border Cities, INTERCEPT (July 14, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/07/14/trump-remain-in-mexico-policy/ [https://perma.cc/2X2A-E5RK].
329. See Rachel Schiidtke, Will the U.S.-Mexico MigrationDeal Work? HereAre the 6 Things
You
Need
to
Know,
WASH.
POST
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/27/will-us-mexico-migration-deal-work-here-arethings-you-need-know/?utm-term=.be64d57191 lb [https://perma.cc/DME4-TH4S] (discussing Central
American migrants' undiminished pressure to reach the United States, perhaps with the aid of
smugglers).
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Third-partyHarm

Ultimately, the law should permit or accommodate otherwise prohibited
rescue when the liberty of the rescuer, the dignity of the beneficiary, and the
absence of significant third-party harm all align. Consideration of third-party
harm means that rescuers and beneficiaries cannot simply contract for rescue
without regard to externalities. With respect to migrant rescue, the relevant
externalities or harms range from the concrete and compensable to the theoretical
and non-compensable.3 3 0 Further, some harms are arguably permissible in some
contexts. 331
None of the claimed harms justify a criminal prohibition on migrant rescue.
On the concrete side, some ranchers along the southern border have complained
that unauthorized migrants damage their land, cut their fences, leave garbage that
sickens their cattle, or keep gates open, allowing cattle to wander away.33 2 Some
ranchers also complain of theft or break-ins.33 3 Rescuers at times also impose
costs on ranchers by, for example, seeking permission to place water stations on
their land. 334 The government regards their acts of leaving bottles of water in
nature preserves as "littering." 335 But all of these harms are compensable, and
thus, capable of redress outside of the criminal law. 336 More theoretical harms
could take the form of the undermining of a freedom of association of the polity,
a right to collective self-determination, control over the culture, and, most
theoretical, the protection of sovereignty.337 These are theoretical harms because
they undermine an idea more than they threaten any protected interest in life,
liberty, or property. Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B. 1, rescue itself does not
violate sovereignty, for the border transgression has already occurred. One might
worry that rescue will incentivize the irregular crossings that constitute
sovereignty violations. But an empirical claim that rescue functions as a pull
330. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 53.
331. For a nuanced treatment of the concept of "harm" in religious freedom cases, see Stephanie
H. Barclay, First Amendment "Harms," 95 IND. L.J. 331, 338 (2020) (proposing a framework of First
Amendment harms that includes prohibited harms and those "that can be balanced against other harms").
332. ROSE, supranote 2, at 53; see also Melissa del Bosque, 'This Is Our Home', Part 2 ofBeyond
the
Border,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
13,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/nginteractive/2014/aug/13/-sp-border-crisis-texas-ranchers-brooks-county-smugglers-deaths
[https://perma.cc/VV6F-NHXW] (describing the dilemma south Texas landowners face between
protecting their property and saving migrant lives).
333. ROSE, supra note 2, at 53.
334. Id
335. Rafael Carranza, Four Aid Volunteers Found Guilty of Dropping Off Water, Foodfor
Migrants
in
Arizona
Desert,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
20,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/01/20/volunteers-guilty-dropping-water-foodmigrants-arizona-desert/2632435002/ [https://perma.cc/4Q4L-N8BE].
336. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799 (1992) (characterizing the civil law system as a "compensatory
scheme, focusing on damage rather than on blameworthiness").
337.
See generally Wellman, supra note 24, at 12 (discussing a polity's right to political selfdetermination); SONG, supra note 297, at 69 (discussing the principle of collective self-determination in
a democracy).
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factor has to contend with the slew of potent push factors also acting upon
migrants in their home countries. 338 It assumes migrants are deterrable-a claim
lacking empirical support.3 3 9 As a result, the net effect of rescue is at best
uncertain. Thus, neither type of harm justifies a criminal prohibition.
Relatedly, some harms might be permissible, such as technical violations
of immigration law, but other harms might be impermissible, such as a migrant's
340
act of violence against some other person present in the United States.
Although available data demonstrates that immigrants have lower incarceration
rates than native-born Americans, the myth of "criminal aliens" endures
nonetheless, 341 and, of course, some noncitizens do commit crimes. Given the
current empirics, the probability of an asylum seeker or other migrant
committing a crime is extremely low. Without data demonstrating some basis for
linking unauthorized migrant status and crime, the feared harm is simply too
remote, even if there are actual instances of unauthorized migrants committing
crimes. Thus, concerns based on technical violations of the law or on
unsubstantiated fears of crime similarly do not justify a criminal prohibition on
rescue.
Consideration of third-party harm in other settings, however, demonstrates
that not all currently prohibited rescue should be permitted. In some cases, thirdparty harms are unacceptable. Take, for example, prison rescue, a crime under
federal and state law. 342 Specifically, federal and state law prohibit not only
prison escapes, but also the act of helping someone break out of prison or hide
from the authorities. Given the legacies of mass incarceration, overcriminalization, and over-punishment, 343 a private citizen might seek to "rescue"
prisoners whom they regard as unjustly incarcerated. One could analogize such
action to the direct service or civil initiative of the sanctuary movement with
respect to asylum seekers. Apart from promoting rescuers' liberty to engage in
338. See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Traffickingfrom IdeologicalCapture: ProstitutionReform
andAnti-traffickingLaw and Policy, 158 U.PA. L. REv. 1655, 1660 (2010) (discussing push factors and
pull factors).
339. Cf Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 237,240-50 (2019)
(finding no empirical support for the claim that immigration detention deters migrants).
340. For a discussion of permissible and impermissible harms in the religious-freedom context,
see Barclay, supranote 331.
OF

RUBEN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE MYTH
341.
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATiON 1-3, 6-10 (2007),
2

2
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Imm/%2Criminality/` O%
8IPC%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPT6-42EE ]; see also ANNIE LAURIE HINES & GiOvANNI PERi, IZA-

INST. OF LABOR ECON., IMMIGRANTS' DEPORTATIONS, LOCAL CRIME AND POLICE EFFECTIVENESS 3-

4 (2019), http://ftp.iza.org/dpl2413.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZMV-HVDN] (arguing that deportations
pursuant to the Secure Communities program did not lead to decreases in crime rates).
342. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1072 (2018) ("Concealing escaped prisoner"), ME. STAT. tit. 17-A,
§ 756 (2020) ("Aiding escape"); IDAHO CODE § 18-2501 (2019) ("Rescuing prisoners").
343. See Allegra M. McLeod, PrisonAbolition and GroundedJustice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156,
1223-24 (2015) (describing the need for a prison abolitionist ethic to confront the legacy of
overcriminalization and overpunishment); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,420 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (describing conditions of"filth," "rape," and "brutality" in America's prisons).
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rescue, permitting assistance to prisoners seeking to escape would promote the
prisoners' dignity by liberating them from possibly inhumane conditions. 3" But
forcible escape from a secure facility will likely lead to violence. And unlike the
case of the recent migrant who has yet to lodge their claim for asylum, the
prisoner has been afforded some due process (however flawed) prior to
incarceration.3 45 Moreover, humanitarians saving migrant lives encounter them
serendipitously, rather than arranging for their travel into the country, which
would amount to smuggling. 34 6 Thus, this theory would not automatically justify
the "rescue" of prisoners.
Similarly, this theory would not justify anti-abortion protesters preventing
a woman from entering an abortion clinic to "rescue" fetuses from abortion
procedures.3 47 Opponents of abortion might invoke their liberty to engage in
rescue and the fetus's implied consent, but forced pregnancy produces
overwhelming harm to a pregnant woman in continuing her unwanted and
possibly unsafe pregnancy.3 48 Pregnant women and new mothers in the United

344. E.g., Katie Benner & Shaila Dewan, Alabama's Gruesome Prisons:Report FindsRape and
Murder at All Hours, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/us/alabamaprisons-doj-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/5KGV-DBTA]; cf Judith Zubrin Gold, Comment,
Prison Escape and Defenses Based on Conditions:A Theory of Social Preference, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
1183 (1979) (discussing role of the necessity and duress defenses in prison escape prosecutions).
345. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the
Legitimacy of CriminalJustice, 3 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 107 (2005) (criticizing the Warren Court's
approach to criminal procedure, based on selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights rather than
fundamental fairness).
346. The proposed theory, however, would potentially justify permitting private individuals to
give water, food, or basic medical care to an injured prisoner who had already escaped, so long as the
private individual does not hide the person from the authorities.
347. See Bernard Nathanson, OperationRescue: Domestic Terrorism or Legitimate Civil Rights
Protest?, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 28 (1989).
348. Tellingly, the common law has never imposed on pregnant women the duty to rescue fetuses
growing inside them. Anita Bernstein, Common Law Fundamentalsof the Right to Abortion, BUFF. L.
REV. 1142, 1147 (explaining historical treatment of abortion under common law and noting absence of
a common law duty to rescue a fetus). Nowadays, many state statutes impose on pregnant women a duty
to rescue, as state legislatures have increasingly adopted criminal prohibitions on abortion based on
particular religious notions about when life begins. See Annalisa Merelli & Ana Campoy, These Are All
the States that Have Adopted Anti-abortion Laws So Far in 2019, QUARTZ (May 30, 2019)
https://qz.com/1627412/these-are-all-the-states-with-anti-abortion-laws-signed-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/95DM-J6WV]; Matthew Bell, When DoesLife Begin? It Might Depend on Your Faith,
PuB. RADIO INT'L (May 17, 2019) https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-17/when-does-life-begin-itmight-depend-your-faith [https://perma.cc/92Z9-FTM3]. Thus, women in a number of states have
limited to no access to abortion and face criminal penalties for not carrying a pregnancy to term. Implicit
in this regime is the view that the harm to a pregnant woman in whom a fetus grows (possibly without
her consent, as in the case of rape) can almost never outweigh the potential life of the fetus. See Opinion,
28,
2018)
(Dec.
N.Y.
TIVES
Rights,
A
Woman's
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/28/opinion/pregnancy-women-pro-life-abortion.html
[https://perma.cc/8YL8-ZLFQ]. On this view, what I characterized as "third-party harm" is set to zero.
Thus, by simply "weighing" the three elements differently, opposing parties can use the same theory to
advance their claims. Accordingly, my limited purpose in offering this theory is to illustrate why my
justification for permitting migrant rescue does not require permitting all currently-prohibited forms of
rescue.

662

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:619

States are more likely to die than pregnant women and new mothers in any other
developed country.3 49 Black pregnant women face even greater risks, with a
maternal mortality rate three times higher than that of white pregnant women. 350
Thus, pregnancy can endanger a woman's body and life, beyond her life plans
and her economic independence. 35 1 Until recent times, when the law has
permitted someone to rescue someone else, it has never required so much from
so-called third parties. Thus, the theory offered herein does not support
uniformly eliminating all prohibitions on rescue. 35 2
The normative considerations identified here support migrant rescue
defined as humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants. Based both on rescuer
liberty and migrant dignity, and the absence of serious third-party harm, criminal
penalties should not attach to acts of migrant rescue.
III.
RESCUE, EXPOSED: THE NEED FOR PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS IN THE LAW

Rescuers engaged in "illegal" rescue face a recurring dilemma that the law
cannot resolve without substantial reform. But even absent transformative law
reform, rescuers still might find relief through existing legal tools. Robert M.
Cover, in his examination of the entire legal framework upholding and
perpetuating slavery amid judges' serious doubts about its morality and legality,
demonstrated that the clash of law and morality is much more complex than we
appreciate. 33 For example, as Cover demonstrates, the law is not simply
given. 35 4 Instead, judges interpret statutes, and a whole range of actors in the
349. Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, US. Has the Worst Rate of MaternalDeaths in the
Developed World, NPR (May 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/528098789/u-s-has-theworst-rate-of-maternal-deaths-in-the-developed-world [https://permacc/4XD5-LHM6].
350. Amy Roeder, America is Failing its Black Mothers, HARv. PUB. HEALTH (Winter 2019),
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/magazine/magazine article/america-is-failing-its-black-mothers/
[https://perma.cc/US33-JPWT] (showing the maternal mortality rate for black women to be 40 per
100,000, while white women have a maternal mortality rate of 12.4 per 100,000).
351. Professor Bernstein has argued that forcible pregnancy creates an affirmative duty to benefit
another risking one's labor, health, well-being, and future economic prospects. Bernstein, supra note
348, at 1146. Because tort law generally disavows any such duty, the right to abortion can be said to
have common law roots. Id. at 1147, 1184. Apart from causing these potential harms to women's lives
and bodily integrity, rescue in this setting interferes with women's reproductive rights, nominally
protected by the Constitution. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973);
Meghan Boone, Reproductive Due Process, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing
the private interests in avoiding forced pregnancy).
352. Typically, when discussing pregnancy and rescue, the pregnant woman is cast as the rescuer
of the fetus, and the debate is over whether the rescue is mandatory or discretionary. See Bernstein,
supranote 348, at 1146. Where abortion is available, the duty is discretionary; where abortion is illegal,
it is a mandatory duty. I have reframed the analysis so that third-parties are "rescuers" and the pregnant
woman is, in effect, the third party, to meet potential objections that my theory would automatically
allow anyone who believes they are engaging in rescue to do so, provided the beneficiary consents,
implicitly or explicitly. That is not so.
353. See COVER, supra note 16, at 6-7.
354. See id. at 6 (noting that, "in a dynamic model, law is always becoming").
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criminal justice system have discretion to implement them. These protective
3 55
mechanisms at times offer legal cover to otherwise seemingly illegal rescue.
This discussion of protective mechanisms of the law starts with the premise
that outright legalization of currently prohibited rescue is not immediately
achievable. Statutory reform, if possible, would offer the greatest protection to
rescuers and beneficiaries alike, assuming third-party harms are modest or
negligible. In the context of migrant rescue, decriminalizing entry without
inspection, perhaps by recasting irregular entry as a civil violation, would free
6
migrants from the criminal justice system's clutches.35 If the government
decriminalizes the underlying entry, then one common rationale for
criminalizing harboring flounders as well. Creating new pathways for legal entry
35 7
Barring such
would also depress the demand for irregular border crossings.
developments, however, the law nonetheless contains important tools for
rescuers, beneficiaries, and their allies.
Protective mechanisms relevant to the law of rescue vary. They could
appear in the judiciary's interpretation of prevailing law and in the discretion of
government actors. Other relevant tools could include the use of religious
exemptions under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and, with
respect to migrant rescue specifically, the potential licensing of humanitarian
35 8
Although this Article
NGOs to permit some amount of migrant rescue.
defends and promotes use of these protective mechanisms to differing degrees,
it also acknowledges the potential trade-off between seeking protection within
existing law and challenging the premises of the existing system. 359
A.

Statutory Interpretation

The judicial authority to interpret the law, firmly grounded in the common
law system of adjudication, provides the most fundamental source of protection

355. See Kate Masur, Commentary, Chicago'sResistance to ICE Raids RecallsNorthern States'
2019),
15,
(July
TRIB.
CHI.
Act,
Slave
Fugitive
the
to
Response
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-ice-raids-fugitive-slave-law20190715-puz4oclc4nczxotfjvhxj5idjq-story.html [https://perma.cc/FU4Q-GVQR] ("[T]he structure of
government in the United States allows space for resistance to unjust federal policies.").
356. See Jessica Zhang & Andrew Patterson, The Most ProsecutedFederalOffense in America:
A Primer on the Criminalization of Border Crossing, LAWFARE (July 25, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/most-prosecuted-federal-offense-america-primer-criminalizationborder-crossing [https://perma.cc/H2K5-VJ2G].
357. See Stephanie Leutert & Caitlyn Yates, What Are the Legal Pathwaysfor CentralAmericans
to Enter the US.?, LAWFARE (July 17, 2018) https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-are-legal-pathwayscentral-americans-enter-us [https://perma.cc/2ZPW-G85Y]; Stephanie Leutert, (@Sleutert), TWITTER
8 329 28
https://twitter.com/Sleutert/status/115697059615 3
AM),
9:51
2019,
1,
(Aug.
[https://perma.cc/8BZN-WS4E].
358. See infra Parts [ll.A-D.
359. See, e.g., Dara Lind, "Abolish ICE," Explained, VoX (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/19/17116980/ice-abolish-immigration-arrest-deport
[https://perma.cc/54S7-LP72] (describing movement to defund ICE and its critique of the legitimacy of
deportation).
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to rescuers. In Justice Accused, Robert M. Cover describes a "dynamic model"
of interpretation-one in which "law is always becoming[,] [a]nd the judge has
a legitimate role in determining what it is that the law will become." 360 For
example, during the century leading up to the Civil War, judges (and advocates)
appealed to natural rights, natural law, 361 international law, 362 statutory
presumptions in favor of liberty, 363 and federalism to attempt to vindicate the
humanity of enslaved people. 364
Although arguments based on natural law and natural rights played a
central role in early arguments for emancipation and then abolition, they
ultimately proved unsuccessful. The legal system eventually tamed nature, 365
and "natural law condemnation of slavery came to mean not a common cultural
tradition but a personal ... preference." 366 As a result, appeals to natural law and
natural rights served as only a limited resource to advance the cause of abolition;
multiple other factors such as public opinion and blacks "acting as if they were
free" contributed to the abolition of slavery. 367
Nonetheless, natural law retained a role in statutory interpretation during
this period. It informed judicial construction of statutory purpose in "furtherance
of the natural right to freedom," induced judges to regard statutory ambiguity as
grounds for advancing liberty, and led courts to presume an aggressive
"obligation to achieve a profreedom result unless there is a very specific,
concrete positive law that prevents it." 36 8 Thus, moral condemnation of slavery
infused statutory interpretation through pro-freedom rules of thumb,
presumptions, and a requirement of a clear statement to abrogate liberty.
Similarly, contemporary judges are empowered to interpret federal
harboring law to permit humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants. Some
scholars have argued that judges should interpret the term "harboring" not to
include the provision of food, water, and medical care to unauthorized
migrants.3 69 At one level, the argument recalls Jim Corbett's view that the
protection of basic rights can never be illegal. 370 But even focusing on the text
of INA's various anti-harboring provisions together, one could argue that
Congress has already deemed unobjectionable the "room, board, travel, medical
assistance, and other basic living expenses" provided to an unauthorized migrant

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
protection

COVER, supra note 16, at 6.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 101.
Id at 62.
See id. at 183.
See id. at 31. "Nature Tamed" is the title of Part I of Cover's book.
Idat 30.
Id at 49.
Id.at 62.
See Campbell, supra note 28, at 98-100.
Corbett, supra note 5, at n.3 ("But there should no longer be any question that the nonviolent
of human rights is never illegal.").
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performing an invocation or missionary work. 371 Thus, Congress does not regard
3 72
On the
the provision of these items to some unauthorized migrants as harmful.
other hand, if Congress wanted to exempt the provision of these very goods in
settings outside of missionary or ministry work, it could have done so. Moreover,
in identifying permitted assistance in a narrow setting, Congress impliedly did
3 73
not intend to permit it in a setting not identified.
Even given the above, does it then follow that the provision necessarily
criminalizes such aid in all other circumstances? Is a judge required to conclude
that providing food, water, shelter, or medical care to unauthorized migrants
violates the law?37 4 Scholars have argued that the anti-harboring provisions'
"collocation" of "harbors" with "conceals" and "shields from detection"
suggests similar meanings of the words, but the use of "or" could also suggest
375
that each word possesses distinct meaning. Apart from relying on textual and
linguistic canons of construction, judges also rely on substantive canons based
37 6
in this vein, one
on "constitutional values and broader policy considerations."
of construction,
canon
a
scholar has argued that courts should view RFRA as
counseling that courts adopt an interpretation of a statute that minimizes burdens
on religious practice. 377 According to this argument, courts should interpret the
harboring statute not to reach humanitarian aid provided by churches and other
religious communities. 37 8 Others, writing more generally, and not specifically
3 79
Such a
about immigration, have argued for recognition of a "dignity canon."
canon might channel concerns for secular rescuers' free association rights, as
well as migrants' dignity interests, and support an interpretation that permits
provision of food, water, and medical care, even if it prohibits evading
immigration authorities.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) (2018).
371.
Some have argued that the existence of the missionary exception to the harboring statute
372.
lends support to sanctuary workers' claim to an exemption under the RFRA. See Scott-Railton, supra
note 29, at 448.
This argument by negative implication relies on "[a] wedding" of the canon of construction
373.
known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius and the presumption of consistent usage. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION 470 (2014).

374. See Government's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3,
supranote 9, at 3, 14 (implying that transporting an injured migrant to a medical facility to receive care
would be permissible).
375. E.g., Loken & Bambino, supra note 211, at 145-46. Relatedly, one could argue that failure
to give every word significance would render the word "surplusage." Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-Inthe Classroom andin the Courtroom,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 812 (1983) (expressing
skepticism that statutes are more carefully drafted than judicial opinions or academic articles, which
contain surplusage).
Noah B. Lindell, The Dignity Canon, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 431 (2017);
376.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 373, at 447-48.
377. See Stephanie Acosta Inks, ImmigrationLaw's Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by
RFRA, 2019 BYU L. REV. 107,112.
378. See id. at 147.
379. E.g., Lindell, supra note 376, at 415.
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Setting aside reliance on new canons of construction, if courts construe
harboring as ambiguous, perhaps even after the application of standard
interpretive tools, equitable considerations captured by the rule of lenity might
apply.38 0 The sort of analysis Cover identified among anti-slavery judges
adjudicating cases under the Fugitive Slave Acts serves as an example for other
"moral-formal" dilemmas, 81 where the legal system pits liberty-a titan among
moral values-against the formal principles that constrain the work ofjudges.3 8 2
Judges interpreting the harboring statute have freedom within their judicial role
to narrow the scope of harboring liability.
B.

Religious Exemptions

Religious exemptions offer another safety valve for those who perform acts
of rescue out of a sense of religious or spiritual compulsion. Some scholars
advocate for exemptions as a form of robust protection for free exercise rights, 383
while others raise concerns about gutting generally applicable laws 38 4 that may
lead to dignitary harms to third parties in particular settings. 385 Members of the
LGBTQ community, for example, could find themselves refused service at a
public accommodation, such as a bakery, on account of the purveyor's religious
beliefs. 386 Ultimately, these exemptions are underdeveloped and underutilized in
the migrant rescue setting. At the same time, advocates pursuing religious
exemptions for their clients should recognize that the carve-out effectively

&

380. Under the rule of lenity, courts resolve "irreconcilably ambiguous" statutes in favor of a
criminal defendant. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L. REV. 276, 475
(2008).
381. Cover describes this as a question of "whether the moral values served by antislavery (the
substantive moral dimension) outweighed interests and values serviced by fidelity to the formal system
when such values seemed to block direct application of the moral or natural law proposition." COVER,
supra note 16, at 197.
382. See id.
383. See Stephanie A. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-applied
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1599 (2018) (arguing that
religious exemptions offer comparable protection for free exercise rights as provided for other First
Amendment rights through as-applied challenges).
384. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (noting
troubling "prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind"), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2018), invalidatedby City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2018), as recognizedin Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014).
385. Compare Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion andPolitics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518 (2015) (noting the impact on
third parties of complicity-based conscience claims made by people of religious faith), with Barclay
Rienzi, supra note 383, at 1633 (arguing that risks of gutting generally applicable laws via religious
exemptions are overblown when religious exemptions are understood as equivalent to "as-applied"
challenges common to First Amendment jurisprudence).
386. See Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle,34 CONST. COMMENT. 171,
187 (2019).
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centers the rescuers' conscience and religious practice and erases migrants from
consideration. Thus, religious exemptions on their own cannot lead the way to
lasting, structural reform.
The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) applies to all federal
3 87
The statute prohibits the federal government from substantially
laws.
burdening "a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability" unless the government can demonstrate that the burden
represents the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest.3 88 Scholars have explained that a person claiming an RFRA exemption
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they hold a belief that
is religious in nature; that the belief is sincerely held; and that the government's
conduct substantially burdens the exercise of this sincerely held religious
belief.3 8 9 Upon making this showing, the claimant wins unless the government
can demonstrate that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a
390
compelling governmental interest. RFRA further creates a claim or defense in
a judicial proceeding for any person whose religious exercise the federal
391
government has substantially burdened in violation of the statutory standard.
392
-the
Ultimately, Congress passed RFRA to revive Sherbert v. Verner
broader
grants
claims-which
Exercise
Free
governed
previously
that
precedent
Free Exercise rights than secured by subsequent interpretation of the First
393
Amendment.
Church volunteers faced prosecution for assisting undocumented migrants
394
during the sanctuary movement in the 1980s, and some volunteers with faithbased NGOs have been prosecuted much more recently. 39 As recounted above,
in early 2018, the government indicted No More Deaths volunteer Scott
3
Warren. 396 Warren asserted a defense under RFRA 97 arguing that the federal
government's prosecution for immigrant "harboring" substantially burdened his
387. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2018). Congress further burnished protection for the free exercise
of religion through the passage of the Religious Land Use for Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695-96 (2014), and the Court dismissed an
Establishment Clause challenge to RLUIPA, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
388.
Brief of and by Professors of Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant's
389.
Motion to Dismiss at 4, United States v. Warren, No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC (DTF) (D. Ariz.
June 21, 2018).
390. Id; Burwell, 573 U.S. at 690-91.
391. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-l(c).
392. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), overruled by Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
393. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 746 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
394. See, e.g., Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a PoliticalTrial: The Sanctuary Movement and
PoliticalJustice, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 381 (1990).
395. See, e.g., Indictment, supranote 10 (charging document).
396. Id.
397. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (creating a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding for any person
whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of RFRA); see Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Counts 2 and 3, United States v. Warren, supra note 11.
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"sincerely-held religious belief." 3 98 A geography instructor who made his home
in Ajo, Arizona, in proximity to migrants facing deadly conditions, Warren
delivered humanitarian aid through the Unitarian church's ministry for several
years prior to his arrest.3 99 He aided migrants based on his "spiritual belief in the
inherent worth of every human being and the corresponding duty to provide lifesaving care to fellow human beings in distress"-a belief, his lawyers argued,
that many of the world's major religions articulate. 400 He argued that his
sincerely held religious beliefs compelled him to help migrants in the desert, and
that the federal government could justify its prosecution only if it was the least
restrictive means for advancing a compelling governmental interest. 401
The District Court presiding over Warren's first harboring prosecution
denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on RFRA; instead, it ruled that
the defendant retained the option to reassert the defense at trial. 402 The
government argued that Warren's assistance was not compelled by his beliefs,
and that his assistance was not humanitarian aid, as they believed that the
migrants faced no imminent danger or distress.403 It further argued that the
government had used the "least restrictive means" for advancing its "compelling
interests." 4 4 Ultimately, Warren's jury hung, and his first trial did not settle the
applicability of an RFRA defense to migrant-harboring charges. 405
Warren prevailed on his RFRA defense, however, with respect to a
misdemeanor charge. 406 In a "watershed" moment for the interpretation of
RFRA, 407 the District Court acquitted Warren on an abandonment of property
charge, but it found him guilty of driving in a restricted wilderness area. 4 08 The
court concluded that restrictions on driving in wilderness areas did not
substantially burden Warren's religious beliefs.40 9 The prohibition on

398. See Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3, supra note 9, at 8-13.
399. Id. at 2, 11.
400. Id. at 1 In.5.
401. Id. at 8, 21-25.
402. United States v. Warren, No. MJ-17-0341-TUC-BPV, 2018 WL 6809430, at *2, *5 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 27,2018).
403. See Government's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3,
supra note 9, at 9-12.
404. See id at 16-17.
405. See Isaac Stanley-Becker, An Activist Faced20 Years in Prisonfor Helping Migrants. But
Jurors
Wouldn't
Convict
Him.,
WASH.
POST
(June
12,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/12/scott-warren-year-sentence-hung-jury-aidingmigrants/ [https://perma.cc/455Y-YJ49].
406. Order at 2, Warren, No. 17-00341MJ-001-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2019) (order
acquitting Warren of one misdemeanor count based on the RFRA).
407. Religious FreedomLaw Plays Key Role in Migrant-Aid Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2019-11-26/religious-freedom-law-playskey-role-in-migrant-aid-case [https://perma.cc/GSL8-V9JF].
408. Order, supra note 406, at 2-3.
409. Id. at 3.
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abandoning property did, however, because Warren's religious beliefs
compelled him to leave jugs of water in the desert. 4 10
Scholars of religious freedom endorsed the RFRA defense in Warren's
case, 4 1 1but others have noted that exemptions also carry risks generally. 4 12 For
example, Professors Reva B. Siegel and Douglas NeJaime have argued that the
increasing use of religious exemptions in the context of the "culture wars"
imposes impermissible third-party harms. 4 13 When the Governor of South
Carolina successfully invoked RFRA to exempt faith-based adoption agencies
from placing children with parents who do not pass the agency's religious
"litmus test," 4 14 critics decried the decision for sanctioning discrimination using
public dollars. 415 In addition, recent surveys show an increased willingness on
the part of various religious communities to support the legality of religion-based
refusal to serve black people, Muslims, Jews, LGBTQ people, or other
minorities. 416 At some point, religious exemptions stand to eviscerate antidiscrimination norms by authorizing groups to discriminate in public
accommodations based on characteristics such as race. 4 17 Those who back a
robust system of religious exemptions, however, argue that the alternative,
gutting religious freedom, is equally problematic. 4 18 As noted above, much
depends on the meaning and significance of "harm." 419

410. See id at 2.
411. Briefof and by Professors of Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 389.
412. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 385, at 2520.
413. See id (characterizing the original focus of the RFRA to be protection of minority religious
communities from generally applicable laws that burden their religious practice, but the current use of
RFRA to be primarily for majority religious communities seeking exemptions from including or
transacting with third parties whose conduct they deem sinful).
414. Letter from Henry McMaster, Governor, S.C., to Steven Wagner, Acting Assisting Sec'y,
Admin. for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://govemor.sc.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/newsroom/Scanned%20from%20ECOS-XRSH119.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SQD-JVAX]; Emanuella Grinberg, South Carolina Foster Care
Providers Can Reject People Who Don't Share Their Religious Beliefs, CNN (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/23/politics/south-carolina-religious-freedom-nondiscrimination-waiverhhs/index.html [https://permacc/MH3E-DSC4].
415. See, e.g., Meg Kinnard, Lawsuit Claims Discriminationby South CarolinaFoster Agency,
WLOS NEWS 13 (Feb. 15, 2019), https://wlos.com/news/local/ap-exclusive-lawsuit-claimsdiscrimination-by-south-carolina-foster-agency [https://perma.cc/6L8J-YNZT].
416. E.g., ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., INCREASING SUPPORT FOR
(2019),
https://www.prri.org/wpREFUSALS
7-13
SERVICE
RELIGIOUSLY
BASED

&

content/uploads/2019/06/PRRIJun_2019_Service-Refusal.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HCN-UUCG].
417. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Agora, Dignity, andDiscrimination:On the Constitutional
Shortcomings of "Conscience"Laws that Promote Inequality in the Public Marketplace, 20 LEWIS
CLARK L. REV. 1221, 1249 (2017); Joseph William Singer, Propertyand Sovereignty Imbricated: Why
Religion Is Not an Excuse to Discriminatein Public Accommodations, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
519, 542 (2017) (noting that public accommodations, unlike homes and churches, "cannot choose which
customers to serve").
418. See Barclay, supra note 331, at 359.
419. See id.
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Advocates asserting an RFRA defense for defendants charged with
harboring for providing humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants are
developing an important protective mechanism contained in the law. However,
they should also recognize the risks of locating the illegitimacy of the
prosecution in the individual defendant's conscience or religious practice rather
than in the dignity of migrants and their right to seek asylum. 420
C.

EquitableDiscretion

Additional protective mechanisms include the vast discretion that various
government actors possess. When high-ranking officials establish laws that
undermine or violate human life and dignity, bureaucrats may facilitate rescue
of vulnerable people using their discretion. They may transform illegal escape
into lawful exit. Similarly, government officials in the criminal legal system
possess discretion to not subject rescuers to criminal charges or punishment.
The twentieth century offers an example of public officials who, by issuing
papers, facilitated the rescue of refugees. 421 During the later years of the
Holocaust, for example, Hungarian officials regularly deported Jews to death
camps. 422 In a display of what historian Paul Levine has called "bureaucratic
resistance," Swedish diplomats issued exit visas from Hungary and entry visas
to haven states to facilitate refugees' flight. 423 Without these papers, any Jewish
4 24
migration out of Hungary was illegal, hazardous, or completely impossible.
Diplomats also issued a range of official-looking documents, including, on
occasion, a simple letter indicating the Swedish government's interest in a
particular refugee. 425 These papers sometimes fell short of facilitating lifesaving
migration; some papers had more modest, domestic effects, such as protecting a
Jewish person from police harassment. 426 As Levine observes, diplomats
themselves, at times, were unsure of the significance or "protective value" of the
427
papers they issued, some of which they invented without much forethought.
428
allowed diplomats to exploit the usual channels
This so-called "paper chase"
of diplomacy for lifesaving outcomes and to functionally evade strictures

420. Cf CORBETT, supra note 272, at 104 (emphasizing legal right of refugees to safe haven and
impliedly rejecting view of sanctuary as charity).
421. See Levine, supranote 30, at 146.
422. Id at 267.
423. PAUL A. LEVINE, RAOUL WALLENBERG IN BUDAPEST 90 (2010) (describing the Schutzpass
and other diplomatic documents used by Swiss and Swedish diplomats to save Jews in Hungary).
424. See id. at 91 ("[A] piece of paper held in one's hand could mean life, because it just might
cause a threatening official to give way.").
425. Levine, supra note 30, at 276 (describing incident of a Jewish man in Budapest who was
released from police custody upon showing a document issued by the Swedish government).
426. Id
427. LEVINE, supranote 423, at 125; see also Photograph of a Schutz-pass Issued by the Swedish
Government,
U.S.
HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL
MUSEUM,
https://collections.ushnuorg/search/catalog/pal055014 [https://perma.cc/474F-JYDV].
428. LEVINE, supranote 423, at 92.
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without openly defying them. 4 29 Through official communications and papers,
bureaucrats exhibited their humane creativity.430
An exercise of bureaucratic discretion often constitutes extraordinary
relief.43 1 In the example of Swedish diplomacy during the Holocaust, diplomats
keenly understood that their rescue efforts would lose effect if they "conceded
too much." 432 The more widespread the exercise of bureaucratic discretion in
favor of vulnerable Jews, the greater the suspicions aroused among German or
Hungarian officials, prompting those officials to scrutinize diplomatic
documents more closely or to refuse to permit Jewish refugees to exit the country
altogether. 433
Bureaucratic discretion in immigration law today resides with consular
officers, asylum officers, CBP officers, and any others who serve as gatekeepers.
Consular officers can issue visas that enable migrants to travel and enter the
United States legally.4 34 Asylum officers have discretion to grant asylum to
eligible applicants. 435 CBP officers have the authority to overlook technical
437
violations of INA. 4 3 6 All of these actors shape and produce migrants' legality.
Similarly, outside of an immigration bureaucracy, individual actors
exercise discretion throughout the criminal legal system, either on their own, or
4 38
Prosecutors
in concert with others. For example, judges can direct verdicts.
can decline to charge defendants, despite having probable cause that the
defendants committed crimes. 43 9 More controversially, juries can nullify

429. Id at 92-93 (discussing bureaucrats' autonomy to evade orders without openly defying
them).
430. And yet these diplomats were no saints. As Levine carefully demonstrates, many of these
same diplomats contributed to restrictive migration laws in the first place. See id
WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION:
See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD
431.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7-13 (2015).

THE

ROLE

OF

432. Levine, supra note 30, at 278 (quoting cable between Swedish diplomats).
433. See id (quoting diplomat on the paradox of rescue); see also Ray, supra note 324, at 1265
("The paradox of humanitarian rescue ... is that it is most effective when rare.").
434. See Consular Career Track, U.S. DEP'T ST., https://careers.state.gov/work/foreignservice/officer/career-tracks/consular [https://perma.cc/X7Y9-CJYPI.
435. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 345 n.12 (A.G. 2018) ("Asylum is a discretionary form
of relief from removal.").
LENA GRABER & JOSE MAGANlA-SALGADO, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., PRACTICE
436.
7
(2016),
PETITIONS
FAMILY
AND
PAROLE,
ADvANCE
DACA,
ADVISORY,

https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/prac-adv-daca
20160531.pdf[https://perma.cc/8TPS-TFCC].
437.

advanceparolefam-pet-

Cf MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN

AMERICA 153-55 (2004) (describing how commissioner general of the INS devised administrative
methods in the absence of law reform to facilitate "legalization of illegal workers").
438. Yeager, supranote 59, at 27 (listing directed verdicts and appellate review as standard tools
in the criminal law to achieve substantive justice).
439. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1683-84 (2010) (defending prosecutors' equitable discretion not
to charge prospective defendants).

672

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:619

deliberations." 0 Seemingly extralegal considerations, including moral ones,
routinely interrupt the enforcement and execution of the law, sometimes with the
law's blessing.
Ultimately, discretion is neither a panacea nor an inherently protective tool.
Although the executive branch can limit its prosecution of irregular entry
offenses,"' President Donald Trump's administration made the opposite choice
early on. Federal prosecutors have brought many more cases against
humanitarians after the U.S. Department of Justice's "zero-tolerance" policy
took effect. 4 4 2 Thus, discretion merely has the potential to protect, depending on
context and the political environment.
D.

AdministrativePre-approvalofHumanitarianAid

Finally, rescuers and allies can challenge blanket criminalization of
humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants through development of an
administrative process, such as permitting or licensing," 3 to preapprove
humanitarian aid."" In the administrative state, as in private law, a license
permits commission of an otherwise illegal act." 5 It also serves as a tool to
regulate the occurrence of a certain activity or its quality." 6 A preapproval
process and regulation generally express the idea that too much of an activity
would produce harm." 7 In addition, such processes typically address concerns
440. See Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury's Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 693-94 (2012)
(defending jury nullification on a functionalist conception of the rule of law, one that "encompass[es]
competing visions and legal interpretations"); cf JEANNINE MARIE DELOMBARD, SLAVERY ON TRIAL:
LAW, ABOLITIONISM, AND PRINT CULTURE 46 (2007) (describing jury's disregard of judge's
instructions in a seditious libel case brought against a critic of the New York governor).
441. See Zhang & Patterson, supra note 356.
442. Lome Matalon, Extending 'Zero Tolerance' to People ho Help Migrants Along the
Border, NPR (May 28, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/28/725716169/extending-zero-toleranceto-people-who-help-migrants-along-the-border [https://perma.cc/SF2M-H6MR] (showing spike in
harboring prosecutions after Sessions' "zero-tolerance" memorandum).
443. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) refers to licenses, but later refers to both
interchangeably. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2018) (defining license as "the whole or a part of an agency
permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
permission"); cf Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of
Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 143-46 (2014) (explaining the
meaning of permit and license in the context of the APA).
444. I thank Martha Minow for suggesting this possibility some years ago.
445. License, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary.org/license
[https://perma.cc/62QS-SXJC]. Biber & Ruhl, supranote 443, at 146 ("[A] permit can be defined as: an
administrative agency's statutorily authorized, discretionary, judicially reviewable granting of
permission to do that which would otherwise be statutorily prohibited.").
446. See, e.g., Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/permits/
[https://perma.cc/9YUR-CJ3G] (noting that state agencies issue hunting and fishing licenses); State and
Territorial Fish
and
Wildhffe
Offices,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/offices/statelinks.html [https://perma.cc/UCG5-R468].
447. See, e.g., Health and Environmental Effects of Hazardous Air Pollutants, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/haps/health-and-environmental-effects-hazardous-air-pollutants
[https://permacc/NPD2-Z69C] (discussing health problems resulting from exposure to "sufficient
quantities of air toxics over time").
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about the quality of a service offered, such as the operation of a childcare
9
facility,44 8 the qualifications of a provider (such as a cosmetologist)," or the
45 0
With respect to
qualifications of a person possessing a deadly weapon.
humanitarian aid, preapproval would remove the risk of prosecution for
organizations administering humanitarian aid, but individual Good Samaritans
or bystanders would likely not benefit.
When it comes to migrant rescue, haven states that generally prohibit all
assistance to unauthorized migrants could allow a select group of NGOs, those
which have been preapproved, to provide humanitarian aid. In so doing, the
haven state would concede the value of humanitarian aid to unauthorized
migrants and allow it when administered by trusted organizations. However, by
stopping short of blanket legalization, the use of a preapproval process also
signals that the state has concerns. It fears that humanitarian aid could go awry.
For example, a state might fear that NGOs will, perhaps unwittingly, serve as
4 51
coconspirators to commercial human smugglers.
Preapproval offers a number of potential benefits to NGOs providing aid,
the government, migrants, and the public. First, it provides some measure of
security to NGOs. It allows them to plan their work in a more stable, certain
environment. Second, it allows the government to consider fully the costs and
benefits of particular NGOs engaging in this work. Third, a preapproval process
directly benefits migrants to the extent it spurs the provision of much-needed
humanitarian aid. Finally, use of a preapproval process could reassure the public
that the government will screen for security risks, but also highlight the legality
of humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants, thus affirming those migrants'
humanity.
Government oversight through preapproval, however, also risks
undermining NGOs' work. Usually, governments impose licensing requirements
for the safety and well-being of the public or consumers, and the safety of
migrants could be one reason for backing a preapproval process for humanitarian
organizations. But a darker purpose lurks. Governments might concede the value
of humanitarian assistance but also wish to limit its efficacy, out of fear that "too

&

CHILD CARE,
OFF.
Child Care Licensing & Regulations,
e.g.,
448. See,
https:/childcare.gov/consumer-education/child-care-licensing-and-regulations
[https://perma.cc/VS6K-B9LA].
449. See, e.g., Barbering and Cosmetology Act, CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE §§ 7301-7426.5 (West
2019).
450. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (2019).
451. See e.g., Atika Shubert & Nadine Schmidt, He Went to Greece to Help Migrants, Now He's
Accused of Trafficking Them, CNN (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/19/europe/searchrescue-volunteers-prison-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/DGQ8-NKB7]; Stuart A. Thompson
Anjali Singhvi, Efforts to Rescue Migrants CausedDeadly, Unexpected Consequences, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/14/world/europe/migrant-rescueefforts-deadly.html [https://perma.cc/G96F-RJJG]; BLAMING THE RESCUERS: CRIMINALISING
SOLIDARITY, RE-ENFORCING DETERRENCE, BLAMING THE RESCUERS, https://blamingtherescuers.org/

[https://perma.cc/AM8X-UP661.
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much" humanitarian assistance will serve as a pull factor, luring more migrants
with greater safety. Thus, a basic question about the potential "harm" exists: is
it harm to migrants who receive poor-quality humanitarian aid, or is it harm to
the governmental objective of minimizing unauthorized migration?
European scholars have demonstrated how licensing requirements function
as a "straightjacket" on NGOs.45 2 They note that, once upon a time, NGOs
rescuing asylum seekers stranded in the Mediterranean en route to Italy operated
without risk of prosecution. 453 Governments valued their humanitarian work and
the funds saved when private humanitarian actors conducted search and rescue
(SAR) work that otherwise would fall to the state. 4 54 By 2017, however, when
countries bordering the Mediterranean found themselves without support from
fellow European Union countries, those countries started viewing with suspicion
and frustration the NGOs performing sea rescue. 4 55 They accused NGOs of
luring migrants into making perilous journeys across the sea, serving as a "pull
factor," and of unwittingly assisting people-smugglers. 45 6
These countries, principally Italy and Greece, have adopted "codes of
conduct" to balance their desire to permit some level of humanitarian assistance
to migrants while suppressing smuggling operations and preventing NGOs from
inadvertently facilitating such operations. 45 7 Under these codes of conduct,
countries permit NGOs to disembark migrants at their ports in exchange for
signing on to the state's terms. 458 These agreements provide legal cover, but they
also expressly hinder the very rescue work for which NGOs seek protection in
the first instance. 4 59 For example, Italy's code of conduct prohibits rescue boats
from shining lights at night, for the very purpose of making those rescue boats
less visible to distressed migrants. 460 Governments "shackle" 4 61 these NGOs out
of fear that the NGOs will inadvertently facilitate for-profit smugglers in making
themselves highly visible. 4 6 2
Other provisions also hobble rescue work. For example, Italy's code of
conduct prohibits transferring rescued people to other vessels, which
functionally requires every NGO vessel to complete a given rescue operation

452. See, e.g., Cusumano, supra note 162, at 113.
453. See id.
454. See id.; Ray, supranote 39, at 1261 (discussing concern that private rescue might crowd out
public SAR expenditures).
455. See Cusumano, supra note 162, at 106-08.
456. See id.
457. See Ray, supranote 39 (discussing state interests behind anti-smuggling laws).
458. See Cusumano, supranote 162, at 107.
459. See id. at 108-11; Isla Binnie & Antonio Denti, Aid Groups Split Over Italy's New Rules
for Migrant Rescues, REUTERS (July 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrantsitaly-ngo/aid-groups-split-over-italys-new-rules-for-migrant-rescues-idUSKBNIAG2FT
[https://perma.cc/5MZ8-FHJJ ].
460.
See Cusumano, supra note 162, at 109.
461. Id. at 108-09.
462. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 451.
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from start to finish; this disrupts the current division of labor between smaller
ships that "temporarily host[] migrants" and larger ships that transport them to
port.4 63 In addition, states extract loyalty promises from NGO personnel,
demanding cooperation with law enforcement at the "place of
disembarkation," 4 " further requiring NGO personnel to cooperate with
investigations into migrant smuggling. NGOs view police presence on a rescue
5
vessel as compromising the "neutrality of the humanitarian space,"46 and
466
scholars have critiqued these and other provisions as redundant or harmful.

For these reasons, preapproval processes for humanitarian NGOs are
potentially problematic, and NGOs disfavor them. A preapproval process
imposes crude regulatory management on a nuanced set of concerns. But
preapproval also undeniably offers NGOs protection. Refining the equilibrium
through discretion and other standard protective mechanisms becomes
paramount; and until the government decriminalizes irregular entry and
humanitarian harboring, preapproval remains an important tool to consider in
reform efforts. Short of systemic change, tools such as statutory interpretation,
religious exemptions, discretion, and preapproval all stand to contribute
meaningfully to a more equitable law of rescue.
E.

Objections

Creating and nurturing protective mechanisms within the law could strike
some as misguided at best or harmful at worst. Some argue that humanitarians
7
and their allies should work toward law reform to decriminalize rescue,4 or to
4 68
go deeper and eliminate the criminal prohibition on entry without inspection.
Efforts to encourage generous exercises of discretion, frequent grants of religious
exemptions, and agreements policing humanitarian aid could undermine this
goal. For one, creating and nurturing mediating safety valves could divert
precious energy away from truly transformative reform and could instead serve
to reaffirm the existing legal regime's criminalization of the very conduct that
renders rescue illegal. 469 For example, it could preserve and entrench prevailing

463. Cusumano, supranote 162, at 110.
464. Id; see also GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 154, at 452-54 (discussing rescue and
disembarkation).
465. Cusumano, supra note 162, at 111.
466. See, e.g., id. at 110.
467. For an argument for a humanitarian exception to the harboring statute, see Ray, supra note
39, at 1271-73 (proposing a humanitarian exception to immigrant harboring).
468. See Daniel I. Morales, Crimes ofMigration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1264 (2014).
This issue specifically has featured prominently in some former 2020 presidential candidates' agendas;
Shikha Dalmia, Julian Castro's Bold Plan to DecriminalizeImmigration Changed the Terms of the
Debate Last Night, REASON (June 27, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/06/27/julian-castros-bold-plan[https://perma.cc/64D3to-decriminalize-immigration-changed-the-terms-of-thedebate-last-night/
QKZF].
469. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of
CriminalJustice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1445-46 (2016) (discussing the opportunity to use the
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attitudes towards unauthorized migration, focusing all the attention on legal
cover for rescuers without focusing on what some regard as an underlying legal
error of punishing entry without inspection as a crime. 470
As noted earlier, such a regime also centers rescuers rather than migrants.
Although the dignity of migrants remains a theme, the focus on protective
mechanisms addresses the problem of criminal punishment of rescuers. Such a
focus risks minimizing the rights and interests of migrants, the intended
beneficiaries. It also risks amplifying gendered, racialized tropes about rescuers
and victims that have dominated human trafficking discourse. 4 7 1 For these
reasons, this Article does not intend to minimize the deeper work of organizing
and advocacy required to achieve a more just immigration system. Instead, both
deep, transformative work and more immediate protections for rescuers are
required.
Safety valves legitimate the existing system, but abandoning them imposes
cruelties on many people. Through these safety valves, new norms can take root,
ultimately leading to a reinterpretation of the law, its repeal, or foundational
reform. An example case from France is instructive. France's Constitutional
Council recently recognized a humanitarian exception to its migrant antismuggling law based on the French constitutional principle of "fraternity." 4 72
This principle connotes brotherhood 473 or solidarity. 474 In that case, the
government prosecuted an olive farmer, Cedric Herrou, for helping migrants
cross France's border with Italy.475 The court ruled that the principle of fraternity
gave Herrou the right to provide humanitarian assistance out of solidarity with
migrants, but it would not protect for-profit smugglers. 476 Although France's
recognition of a humanitarian exception to its migrant smuggling laws followed
from its unique constitutional guarantee of "fraternity," it also appears likely that
its existing civil legal framework, rich in affirmative duties to assist others in
distress, 477 nurtured a jurisprudence that allowed the court to recognize that
principle in the context of migrant rescue. In the United States, a new norm of

law as a '"ratchet' to address racial injustice," but also warning of its potential to "undermine the larger
radical project of transformation").
470. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018) ("Improper entry by alien").
471. See Balgamwalla, supranote 313, at 18.
472. Peltier & Pdrez-Pefla, supra note 68.
473. Lucy Williamson, What Do Liberty, Equality, FraternityMean to France Now?, BBC
NEWS (July 14, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36775634 [https://perma.cc/8PW96X4D].
474. See Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699,
1710 (2006) (book review) (describing solidarity and fraternity as ideals of the French Revolution).
475. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No. 2018-717/718 QPC,
July
6,
2018,
https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/decision/2018/2018717 718QPC.htm
[https://perma.cc/SX75-NYWMJ.
476. Id.
477. See Note, supranote 55, at 646 (describing France's treatment of rescue).
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upholding migrants' dignity could emerge, one that evolves from rescue to
rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the disparate regimes of rescue in the law today are

best understood as tools for promoting efficiency, protecting property rights, and
facilitating commercial relations. It further argues for reorienting the law of
rescue away from its economic foundations to a path more responsive to liberty

and dignity-a path capable of (imperfectly) mediating the clash between the
government's interpretation of prevailing law and the rescuer's competing legal
interpretation or sense of decency. It offers a framework for renegotiating the

line between permissible and prohibited rescue, and considers several tools for
providing protection for illegal but morally-justified rescue. It concludes that
they constitute important experiments in an incremental process of changing
social norms and creating a path for bolder law reform.
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